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ABSTRACT 
As a repercussion of the phenomenal Chinese economic growth over the past few 
decades, China is forced to deal with the challenge of meeting an equally rapid increase 
in energy demand.  China realizes that its continued economic expansion is reliant on its 
ability to meet this growing need. Over 80% of the world’s proven oil reserves located in 
the Middle East, and China realizes that Middle Eastern states will play a vital role in 
Beijing’s ability to meet its energy demands in the future. As a result, China has 
aggressively pursued closer political, military, and economic ties with Middle Eastern 
states. China’s actions have come in conflict with U.S. policies in the Middle East, and 
there currently is much debate regarding China’s intensions in the Middle East. Some 
believe China’s actions are intended to challenge U.S. power and influence in the Middle 
East. Others believe that China is simply acting in its economic interests. This thesis will 
examine China’s policies and actions in the Middle East and will attempt to determine 
whether China is acting in the offensive realism or economic interdependence school of 
thought.  It examines two cases in particular—Saudi Arabia and Iran—and concludes that 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
As a repercussion of the phenomenal Chinese economic growth over the past 
couple decades (with GDP growth averaging 9.6% between 1995-2005), China is forced 
to deal with the challenge of meeting an equally rapid increase in energy demand. China 
is aware that its continued economic expansion is reliant on its ability to meet its growing 
energy demand.  With over 80% of the world’s proven oil reserves located in the Middle 
East, China realizes that Middle Eastern states will play a vital role in China’s ability to 
meet its energy demands in the future. As a result, China has aggressively pursued closer 
political, military, and economic ties with Middle Eastern states.  
Two Middle Eastern states that China has taken a keen interest in are Saudi 
Arabia and Iran. As a result of those two countries being vital to U.S. foreign policy in 
the Middle East, the United States has observed the evolution of the Sino-Iranian and 
Sino-Saudi relationships with caution. The United States views Saudi Arabia as a vital 
energy source and also one of its strongest allies in the Middle East region. The United 
States considers Iran a rogue state that promotes instability in the Middle East, and 
consequently successive presidents from Carter to George W. Bush have carried out an 
isolation and containment policy against it.  
There is little doubt that China’s expanding relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran 
have come in conflict with U.S. policies in the Middle East. China’s expanding 
relationship with Iran is undermining U.S. efforts aimed at isolating and containing 
Tehran. Additionally, some are concerned that the growing Sino-Saudi relationship may 
weaken the U.S.-Saudi relationship.  As a result of this expansion of Chinese influence 
into the Middle East, many people have begun to question Chinese intensions in the area. 
Those who analyze Chinese intensions in the Middle East fall into two main groups. One 
group believes that China’s actions are intended to challenge U.S. power and influence in 
the Middle East. Another group believes that China is simply acting in its economic 
interests and that its expansion into the Middle East can actually increase prospects of 
Sino-U.S. cooperation due to their interests becoming more aligned. These two stances 
are closely aligned with two schools of thought in international relations. Those that 
 xiv
believe China is expanding into the Middle East with the intension to challenge U.S. 
hegemony fit closely with John Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism. Those that 
believe that China is expanding into the Middle East for economic reasons and that its 
expansion will increase the prospects for closer Sino-U.S. relations are aligned with the 
economic interdependence school of thought. 
As the twenty-first century progresses, few doubt that China’s global power and 
influence will increase. The United States will increasingly need to interact with this 
rising power, and in order to do so effectively, we must understand Chinese intensions 








A. BACKGROUND AND SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM 
Since the late twentieth century, China has been steadily increasing its economic, 
political, and military influence in the Middle East region. Much of China’s drive to 
develop closer relations with Middle Eastern states is driven by its growing demand for 
energy. This thesis will examine the political, economic and military impact China’s 
actions have had and will draw hypotheses about the future on United States foreign 
policy and relations with Middle East countries. 
Since the latter half of the twentieth century, the United States has been deploying 
its military forces in the Middle East to maintain regional stability and security as well as 
providing maritime security for U.S. oil tankers in an effort to ensure that its oil supply is 
not disrupted. By playing a vital role in maintaining regional stability and by also being a 
major oil customer in the Middle East, the United States has developed close ties with 
various Middle Eastern governments to include Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, 
Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait.1 Due to the ties with these Middle East countries, the United 
States has been able to exert political and economic influence in the region, which has 
resulted in favorable Middle Eastern security and oil policies for the United States.  
Realizing that its domestic demand for energy will increase, China has also 
aggressively pursued closer economic, political and military ties with various Middle 
East countries in an effort to ensure adequate supplies of energy will exist in the future. 
The Chinese believe that the closer ties it has with its energy suppliers, the greater its 
energy security is enhanced. This has led to an increase in China’s influence with the 
Middle East countries and may have come at the expense of U.S.-Middle East relations. 
In the future, China’s expansion into the Middle East has the potential to affect the 
                                                 
1 Steven A. Yetiv, Crude Awakenings : Global Oil Security and American Foreign Policy (Ithaca, 
N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2004); Robert Baer, Sleeping with the Devil : How Washington Sold our 
Soul for Saudi Crude, 1st ed. (New York: Crown, 2003); Gawdat Bahgat, American Oil Diplomacy in the 
Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003); Jad Mouawad, "Why 
America is More Dependent than Ever on Saudi Arabia," New York Times Aug 6, 2005, 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=878349431&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD. 
2 
political, economic, and military relations the United States has in the Middle East. This 
may in turn affect the future direction of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.  
1. Theoretical Frameworks 
There are two approaches that one might take to the U.S.-China-Middle East 
relations. These two approaches are closely aligned with two schools of international 
relations. The first approach is closely related to the offensive realism school of thought. 
The second approach is closely related to the economic interdependence school of 
thought. Each will be discussed in turn.  
The international relations theory of offensive realism was developed by John J. 
Mearsheimer in his book “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.”2 Mearsheimer’s theory 
of offensive realism, similar to Kenneth Waltz’s theory of defensive realism, is a 
structural theory of international politics. The difference between Waltz and Mearsheimer 
is that in the eyes of an offensive realist, the international system forces great powers to 
maximize their relative power over other nations at every possible opportunity. Offensive 
realists assume that (a) the state is the main actor in foreign policy, (b) state elites have an 
interest in maximizing the autonomy and security of the state, and (c) states are rational 
actors.  
Offensive realists believe that status quo powers rarely exist in global politics. 
They believe that since the international system creates great benefits and incentives for 
states to look for opportunities to gain power and influence at the expense of their rivals, 
states are encouraged to take advantage of those situations where the benefits outweigh 
the costs. By expanding their relative power over their rivals at every opportunity, the 
survivability and security of that great power is increased. In Mearsheimer’s words, 
“survival mandates aggressive behavior.”3 He also believes that a state’s ultimate goal is 
to be the hegemon in a system4; however, even if a state cannot achieve hegemony, 
Mearsheimer believes that states will still act offensively to gain as much power as 
possible because states are almost always better off with more rather than less power.5 
                                                 
2 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 19-22. 
3 Ibid., 21. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., 35. 
3 
The economic interdependence theory within the liberalism school of thought 
points to closer cooperation between nations based on economics. This theory believes 
that the probability of two states entering into an armed conflict between each other is 
inversely proportional to the degree which they are economically interdependent. In other 
words, the more two countries are engaged in bilateral trade, the less they are likely to go 
to war.6 Interdependence between two countries influence their political behavior in two 
ways: (a) because both countries are dependent on each other, they have an economic 
interest in continuing peaceful exchanges, and (b) the interdependence between the two 
countries provides a medium of communication that can be useful in preventing or 
resolving disagreements short of armed conflict.7 
Currently, there is much debate and literature regarding China’s role in the 
Middle East and its implications for U.S. foreign policy. There are two main points of 
view regarding this subject. Some view that China’s actions in the Middle East is 
intended to expand Chinese power and influence at the cost of U.S. power and influence 
in the Middle East. This environment may eventually lead to a conflict between the two 
powers.8 The second view believes that China’s increasing role in the Middle East will 
                                                 
6 Bruce M. Russett and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and 
International Organizations (New York: Norton, 2001), 145. 
7 Ibid., 139. 
8 Flynt Leverett and Jeffrey Bader, "Managing China-U.S. Energy Competition in the Middle East," 
Washington Quarterly, Winter, 2005, 199, 
http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/fellows/20051216_leverett_bader.pdf (accessed April 12, 2006).; 
Barton W. Marcois and Leland R. Miller, "China, U.S. Interests Conflict," The Washington Times, 
http://washingtontimes.com/op-ed/20050324-075950-4488r.htm (accessed February 20, 2007).; Gal Luft, 
"U.S., China are on Collision Course Over Oil," Los Angeles Times February 2, 2004, 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/natres/oil/2004/0202collision.htm (accessed February 20, 2007).; 
John Gee, "Looming Energy Crunch Fuels International Conflict and Instability," Washington Report on 
Middle East Affairs, http://www.energybulletin.net/7435.html (accessed February 20, 2007).; Michael T. 
Klare, "Revving Up the China Threat," Asia Times, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GJ15Ad02.html 
(accessed February 28, 2007). 
4 
foster greater interdependence and cooperation between the United States, China, and 
Middle Eastern nations which would lead to benefits for all sides.9 
In the first view, people believe that China’s expansion into the Middle East has 
increased the competitive nature of the relationship between China and United States. 
This fits in line with the offensive realism school of thought. The United States is 
currently the regional hegemon in the Middle East. Recognizing two points, China has 
undertaken a foreign policy agenda to gain more influence and economic power in the 
Middle East at the cost of the hegemon. The first point is that because oil is a finite 
commodity and is viewed as a vital interest for both the economic and national security 
realms, states must take aggressive actions and gain more power over their rivals in order 
to secure access to greater oil resources. The second point is that China's economic 
prosperity, survivability, and relative position in the world is dependent on securing 
energy sources to meet future energy demands. In the offensive realists’ eyes, China’s 
foreign policy may challenge the United States’ power and influence in the Middle East 
through two ways: (a) by taking actions to undermine U.S. policies in the Middle East, 
and (b) by aggressively pursuing closer ties with traditional U.S. allies in the Middle East 
with the intent to reduce U.S. power and influence in the region. Offensive Realists view 
Sino-U.S.-Middle East relations as a zero sum game10. Because China and the United 
States are looking at the same region of the world for energy and political influence, 
whatever economic, military and political gains China makes will be at the expense of the 
hegemon.  
                                                 
9 Nawaf E. Obaid and others, The Sino-Saudi Energy Rapprochement: Implications for US National 
Security (New York, NY: Gracia Group, 2002), 46, 
http://www.rice.edu/energy/publications/docs/SinoSaudiStudyFinal.pdf (accessed May 17, 2006).; John E. 
McLaughlin, "China, the United States, and the Middle East" Conference Remarks (Washington D.C.: 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006), 5.; Shulong Chu, "The Vital Triangle: China, the 
United States, and the Middle East" (Washington D.C., Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
September 14, 2006), http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/china-middle_east_summary.pdf (accessed 
February 20, 2007).; Jianjun Tu, "The Strategic Considerations of the Saudi-Sino Oil Deal," The China 
Brief, February 15, 2006, 3-5, http://www.jamestown.org/images/pdf/cb_006_004.pdf (accessed January 
18, 2007). 
10 Zero-sum game: Because resources and political/economic/military influence a state can possess are 
finite, whatever gains one actor makes will be at the cost of another.  
5 
Offensive realists believe China realizes that “survival mandates aggressive 
behavior;”11 therefore, the Chinese objective for its aggressive behavior is to improve its 
security and survivability by gaining more power and influence in the Middle East at the 
cost of the United States. The United States, in response to China’s foreign policies, will 
be taking actions to maintain and expand their dominance over China. This confluence of 
Chinese and U.S. actions in the Middle East may potentially lead to a Sino-U.S. armed 
conflict in the Middle East. 
There is another group that believes that China’s expansion into the Middle East 
will not lead to a competitive relationship between the United States and China, but will 
instead lead to greater cooperation. This group’s line of thinking is closely associated 
with the economic interdependence school of thought. Scholars such as John Maynard 
Keynes and Thomas Friedman believe that the “rise of transnational networks, 
nongovernmental organizations, and the rapid advancement and proliferation of 
communications technology throughout the world is undermining the power of states 
resulting in a shifting of attention away from military security toward economics and 
social welfare.”12 This group of thinkers believe that despite China’s increasing influence 
and economic power in the Middle East, neither China nor the United States will take 
hostile military actions against each other for economic reasons.  
People who support this view do so for three main reasons. First, since China is 
highly economically interdependent with the United States, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, it will 
seek to prevent any situation which may jeopardize the ongoing peaceful economic 
exchanges among them; therefore, China will seek greater cooperation with all sides in 
order to avoid an armed conflict in and effort to protect its economic interests. Second, as 
China becomes more economically interdependent with the Middle East as a result of its 
reliance on Middle Eastern oil, the interests of the United States and China in the Middle 
East region will more closely align. Because both countries are reliant on Middle Eastern 
oil, regional stability and the preservation of the status quo are in both countries’ 
economic interests. For example, as Saudi Arabia develops closer economic ties with 
                                                 
11 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 21 
12 Stephen M. Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories," Foreign Policy, Spring 
(1998), 40. (accessed May 17, 2006). 
6 
China, the common regional interests of China and the United States will grow in 
number. The stability, security and the survival of Saudi regime are now in the interests 
of both the United States and China; therefore, cooperation between the two countries 
should increase.13 Third, other issues will also continue to foster closer relations between 
China and the United States such as the strong economic relations between the two 
countries and the need for cooperation in areas such as counter-terrorism and nuclear 
non-proliferation which are crucial to maintaining regional stability in the Middle East.14  
2.  Major Question and Argument 
The major question to be answered in this thesis will be whether China’s policies 
post-1993 (when China became a net importer of oil) in the Middle East are in 
accordance with Mearsheimer’s offensive realism theory or with the economic 
interdependence theory.  Particularly, this thesis will attempt to answer whether (a) China 
is purposively undermining U.S. policies and objectives with the intent to decrease U.S. 
power and influence in the Middle East in order to increase its own security and 
survivability (offensive realism), or (b) China is seeking to influence U.S. behavior in an 
attempt to avoid suffering massive economic losses as a result of an armed conflict in the 
Middle East. Additionally, as time passes, the interests of China and the United States 
should more closely align due to their common regional goals will growing in number; 
therefore, Sino-U.S. cooperation should increase. (economic interdependence). 
The thesis will also attempt to answer whether the political, military and 
economic relations will change between the United States and the Middle Eastern states 
due to China’s increasing influence in the region. These effects will then be examined in 
the context of how it will affect America and China’s relative positions in the world.  
B. METHODOLOGY, THESIS ROADMAP AND SOURCES 
This thesis will be using the case study method to examine this issue. The two 
cases that will be examined will be Iran and Saudi Arabia. These cases were picked in 
order to take into account various variables that may affect China’s approach to Middle 
Eastern countries. First, these two countries were chosen because they have differing 
                                                 
13 Xiaodong Zhang, "China's Interests in the Middle East: Present and Future," Middle East Policy 6, 
no. 3 (Feb, 1999), 155, 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=39718199&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD.  
14 Rachel Bronson. Thicker than Oil: America's Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia, 312. 
7 
relations with China in numerous realms (political, military and economic). While Iran 
and China have strong political, military, and economic relations, the Sino-Saudi 
relationship has not developed its military and political relationship in the same way. 
Secondly, these cases were picked because Saudi Arabia and Iran not only have two of 
the world’s largest oil reserves, but are also two of the top energy exporters to China. 
Further highlighting Saudi Arabia and Iran’s importance to China is the fact that these are 
the two Middle Eastern countries that China assists most in infrastructure development 
(see Table 1). This fact may also serve as a limitation because these two cases will not 
show how China’s policies are geared for non-energy producing Middle Eastern 
countries; however, this limitation is not vital since: (a) much of the Sino-U.S. 
disagreements in the Middle East revolves around each side’s policies toward energy 
producing countries, and (b) China’s activities in the Middle East is driven by its desire to 
improve its energy security. Thirdly, while Saudi Arabia and Iran play a vital role in the 
U.S.’s strategy in the Middle East, each have had differing relations with the United 
States which may affect China’s actions towards them. Because the U.S.-Saudi 
relationship is on friendly terms while the U.S.-Iranian relationship is on hostile terms, 
the U.S.’s policies towards those two countries differ greatly. While other countries in the 
Middle East (i.e. Oman and Yemen) and Northern Africa (i.e. Angola) provide China 
with a substantial amount of energy, their strategic and political value to the United 
States pale in comparison  to that of Saudi Arabia and Iran.  
By comparing two different types of cases and taking into account their varying 
relations with China and the United States, the case studies will more accurately analyze 












































Table 1.   Value of Chinese Infrastructure Projects in the Middle East 
Source: Institute for National Security Studies15 
Chapter II will examine the current Chinese energy situation. Since much of 
China’s reasons for expanding into the Middle East are centered on energy and economic 
issues, it is vital to lay the groundwork for the case studies by examining why China 
needs Middle Eastern energy today, and how that is likely to increase in the future.  
Chapter III will examine the Sino-U.S.-Iranian case and Chapter IV will examine 
the Sino-U.S.-Saudi case. Each case study will examine the economic, political and 
military ties between the countries involved. For the economic sphere, the following will 
be examined: (a) amount of oil being exported to China, (b) oil contracts Iran and Saudi 
Arabia have developed with Chinese companies, (c) amount of trade between China and 
Iran/Saudi Arabia, and (d) the amount of Chinese foreign direct investments/technology 
transfer/technical assistance going into Iran and Saudi Arabia. For the military sphere, the 
amount and nature of arms trade that exists between China, Iran and Saudi Arabia will be 
examined. For the political realm, the following will be looked at: (a) the frequency of 
Chinese diplomatic visits and the political developments due to those visits, and (b) the 
evolution of the Sino-Iranian and Sino-Saudi political relationship over the last few 
decades. Lastly, based on the findings listed above, an analysis will be conducted to 
determine whether China is acting along the lines of the offensive realism or economic 
interdependence.  
                                                 
15 Phillip C. Saunders, China's Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers and Tools (Washington D.C.: 
National Defense University, 2006), 49. 
9 
In the conclusion of the thesis, the two case studies will be contrasted against each 
other to highlight the major differences and similarities between the Sino-Iranian and 
Sino-Saudi relationships. The policy options analysis will be used to evaluate the options 
the United States may take in response to China’s policies in the Middle East. A 
recommendation will also be made as to how the United States should proceed in the 
future.   
Secondary sources will be primarily used for this thesis. Congressional sources to 
include the Government Accountability Office (GAO), Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) and Congressional Research Service (CRS) will be used. Additionally, reports 
from various think tanks will be used such as the Brookings Institute, Carnegie 
Endowment, RAND Corporation, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 
Center for Defense Information (CDI), Gracia group, Middle East Review of 
International Affairs (MERIA), Columbia International Affairs Online (CIAO). Various 
international media articles will also be used from the Open Source Center as well as 
domestic media publications such as the Wall Street Journal and New York Times. 
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II. SINO-MIDDLE EAST ENERGY BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCTION: 
When examining China’s expansion into the Middle East, one must analyze what 
has prompted China to develop closer ties with Middle Eastern governments. Upon 
looking at China’s reasons to expand its ties with Middle Eastern states it quickly 
becomes clear that its main motivation is to ensure that it has adequate energy sources in 
the future to support its economic growth. Energy, and specifically oil politics, has been a 
topic of much debate not only in the economic community but also in the political and 
military communities. This section will analyze: (a) China’s domestic energy situation, 
(b) Why China looks to the Middle East for energy, and (c) U.S. views on the Chinese 
energy situation. 
 
B. CHINA’S DOMESTIC ENERGY SITUATION: 
As a result of China’s growing energy demand, its energy security policies has 
recently garnered more attention in the international realm. Recently, there has been a 
growing amount of literature analyzing China’s growing demand for energy and its 
energy security policies.16 
Over the last two decades, China’s rapid economic growth has caused its oil 
demand to substantially outstrip its domestic production capacity.  Between 1993 and 
                                                 
16 Kenneth Lieberthal and Mikkal Herberg, China's Search for Energy Security (Seattle, WA: The 
National Bureau of Asian Research, 2006), http://www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/pdf/vol17no1.pdf 
(accessed May 17, 2006).; Jeffrey A. Bader and Flynt L. Leverett, "Oil, the Middle East, and the Middle 
Kingdom," Financial Times, http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/fleverett/20050816.htm (accessed 
April 18, 2006).; Anthony Bubalo and Mark P. Thirlwell, Energy Insecurity: China, India and Middle East 
Oil (Sydney, Australia: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2004), 
http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=194 (accessed April 14, 2006).; John Calabrese, "China 
and the Persian Gulf: Energy and Security," The Middle East Journal 52, no. 3 (Summer, 1998), 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=32465051&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD.; 
Simon Henderson, "Chinese-Saudi Cooperation: Oil but also Missiles," The Washington Institute for Near 
East Policy, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2460 (accessed May 18, 2006).; 
Jin Liangxiang, "Sino-Arab Relations: New Developments and Trends," Middle East Policy 11, no. 4 
(Winter, 2004), 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=772394401&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD.; 
Sergei Troush, China's Changing Oil Strategy and its Foreign Policy Implications (Washington D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1999), http://www.brookings.edu/fp/cnaps/papers/1999_troush.htm (accessed April 
20, 2006).; Han Xiaoxing, "China-Middle East Links," The China Business Review 21, no. 2 (Mar/Apr, 
1994), 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=273084&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD.; 
Zhang, China's Interests in the Middle East: Present and Future. 
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2002, China’s oil demand grew by over 90% while its domestic production increased by 
only 15%.17 The demand for energy has come from numerous sources. There is no 
question that China’s phenomenal economic growth has caused its industrial sector to 
consume more energy. But in addition to its industrial sector, there are two other trends 
that have caused China’s energy demand to increase. First, there has been a steady trend 
of people relocating from the rural areas of China to the cities which has resulted in more 
people consuming energy. As more people migrate to the city, the Chinese government 
must take steps to accommodate them. This means that existing cities must be expanded 
and new cities and towns may need to be created. To expand these cities and to create 
new ones, much construction and infrastructure development must take place which 
requires a vast amount of energy.18 Additionally, people living in urban areas consume 
more energy than those living in rural areas. Due to a differing lifestyle (i.e. electric 
appliances), people living in cities consume 3.5 times more energy annually than those 
living in the rural areas.19 Secondly, as China’s population becomes more affluent, the 
number of motor vehicles operating within China will increase substantially. Both these 
trends are shown in Table 2. SINOPEC estimates that China will have over 130 million 
automobiles by 2030.20 In addition to these two trends, the current environmental status 
in China has led to an increased demand for natural gas.  
                                                 
17 Flynt Leverett and Jeffrey Bader, "Managing China-U.S. Energy Competition in the Middle East," 
Washington Quarterly, Winter, 2005, 189, 
http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/fellows/20051216_leverett_bader.pdf (accessed April 12, 2006). 
18 Research Centre for Sustainable Development, Understanding China's Energy Policy (Beijing, 
China: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 2006), 14, http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/media/5FB/FE/Climate_Change_CASS_final_report.pdf (accessed February 25, 2007). 
19 Ibid., 15. 
20 Leverett and Bader, Managing China-U.S. Energy Competition in the Middle East, 189. 
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  1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total Population (millions) 1,143.33 1,211.21 1,267.43 1,276.27 1,284.53 1,292.27
% of Total Living in Cities 26.4 29 36.2 37.7 39.1 40.5 
% of Total Ages 15-64 66.7 n/a 70.2 n/a n/a 71.3 
 
Motor Vehicle Drivers 
(millions) 16.36 35.02 76.56 84.55 93.62 106.11 
Automobile Drivers (millions) 7.91 16.73 37.47 44.63 48.27 53.68 
Table 2.   China’s Population, Indicators of Potential and Actual Drivers 
Source: Congressional Budget Office – Based on China Statistical Yearbook 
200421 
 
The U.S. Energy Information Administration projects China’s oil demand to 
increase approximately 7.8% annually between 2002 and 201022 but China’s domestic oil 
production is not anticipated to substantially increase because China’s oil reserves are: (a) 
tapped out, or (b) difficult to exploit.23 This is ironic because China has traditionally 
viewed itself as a “vast territory with abundant resources.”24 China’s oil production is 
expected to peak at 180-200 million tons by 2020 before it starts declining.25 The major 
oil fields in the Daqing, Liaohe, Jianghan, Dagang, Zhongyuan, and Shengli are already 
believed to be in the mid-late stages of production.26 Although a recent oil and gas 
assessment report assessed that China has more than 102 billion tons of oil resources, 
only 26% of onshore oil have been verified which leads many people to believe that 
China’s exploitable reserves are running short. While China has invested a substantial 
amount of money in new oil fields (Junggar, Tarim and Turpan-Hami oil fields in 
Xinjiang), the harsh climate, complex topography and fragile ecosystems have made the 
                                                 
21 Congressional Budget Office, China's Growing Demand for Oil and its Impact on U.S. Petroleum 
Markets (Washington D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, 2006), 44, 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/71xx/doc7128/04-07-ChinaOil.pdf (accessed March 16, 2007). 
22 Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook 2006 (Washington D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Energy, 2006), 177, http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/pdf/0484(2006).pdf (accessed February 
24, 2007). 
23 Beijing Shidai Chao. PRC S&T: Special Report on Energy Shortage Situation. Beijing, China: 
Beijing Shidai Chao, 2004, Report Number: CPP20050330000164, https://www.opensource.gov (accessed 
February 24, 2007). 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Open Source Center. "China: Mapping Out New Oil Strategy to Avert Oil Crisis." Open Source 
Center. Report Number: CPP20030404000159,  https://www.opensource.gov (accessed July 16, 2006).  
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well-drilling efforts in these oil fields not only difficult, but substantially more  
costly than the other oil fields in China.27  
As for the natural gas situation, the SDPC institute projects China’s demand for 
natural gas to be 100bcm in 2010 and 150bcm in 2020. Due to such obstacles as 
inadequate internal supply and weak infrastructure, China is not expected to meet the 
future demands for natural gas. As a result, China must also rely on foreign sources to 
meet its natural gas demands.28  
C.  WHY DOES CHINA LOOK TO THE MIDDLE EAST FOR ENERGY? 
Despite the fact that China realizes the dangers of becoming reliant on limited 
sources of energy and is attempting to diversify its energy sources globally, the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) expects China to import at least 70% of its oil from 
the Middle East region by 2015.29 China views the Middle East with great importance for 
three reasons. First, the Middle East has a vast amount of natural gas which China 
desires.  Secondly, China realizes that two-thirds of the world’s proven oil reserves are 
located in the Middle East (See Table 3). Furthermore, China recognizes that Middle 
Eastern nations belonging to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
will play an increasingly vital role in supplying global energy in the future.30 Thirdly, the 
Middle East is currently the region with the lowest production cost for oil. In Kuwait for 
example, a barrel of oil costs roughly $2 to produce, while it costs $15 a barrel in 
Canada.31 Because China views the Middle East as a crucial energy partner, it has started 
to develop closer political, military, and economic ties with them.  
                                                 
27 Open Source Center. "China: Mapping Out New Oil Strategy to Avert Oil Crisis." 
28 Xiaojie Xu, "China and the Middle East: Cross-Investment in the Energy Sector," Middle East 
Policy 7, no. 3 (Jun, 2000), 122, 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=56279341&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD. 
29 John Calabrese, "Saudi Arabia and China Extend Ties Beyond Oil," The China Brief, September 27, 
2005, 3, http://www.jamestown.org/images/pdf/cb_005_020.pdf (accessed January 24, 2007). 
30 Energy Information Administration, "Non-OPEC Fact Sheet," U.S. Department of Energy, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/nonopec.html (accessed January 18, 2007). - The U.S. Department of 
Energy stated that “non-OPEC countries' smaller reserves are being depleted more rapidly than OPEC 
reserves, and their overall reserves-to-production ratio - an indicator of how long proven reserves would 
last at current production rates - is much lower (about 26 years for non-OPEC and 83 years for OPEC, 
based on 2004 crude oil production rates).” 
31  Adam Piore, "Digging Deep," Newsweek, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5963495/site/newsweek/ 


























































Table 3.   Proven World Oil Reserves 
Source: Oil and Gas Journal Volume 101.49 December 22, 2003, pp. 43-4732 
 
D. U.S. STANCE REGARDING CHINESE ENERGY SECURITY POLICIES 
There have recently been many reports from the United States, which outline the 
impact China’s growing demand for oil may have on the United States. A Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) study in 2006 projects that China’s rising demand for oil will 
increase the price of crude oil33 and all petroleum products that consumers purchase 
globally.34 China’s increased demand for oil is also likely to increase the volatility of oil 
prices.35 Because the available buffer of excess global oil production capacity is currently 
very small, the ability of oil producers to produce more oil in response to oil supply 
disruptions or surges in demand is limited and most likely will not improve in the 
                                                 
32 U.S. Senate - Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Emerging Global Energy Trends and 
their Implications for U.S. Need, Security and Policy Choices, 2005, 5, 
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/congress/ts050203verrastro.pdf 
33 Richard D. Farmer, China's Growing Demand for Oil and its Impact on U.S. Petroleum Markets 
(Washington D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, 2006), 31, http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/71xx/doc7128/04-
07-ChinaOil.pdf (accessed April 22, 2006). – Chinese oil demand may increase the price of oil as much as 
$7-14 a barrel over the next five years. 
34 Ibid., 27.  
35 Ibid., 3. 
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future.36 As a result, some U.S. experts are concerned that the rising price of energy may 
result in the weakening of the United States economy and its economic status in the 
world.  
E. SUMMARY 
In summary, China realizes that its ability to meet its future energy demands 
strongly hinges on international sources. Facing the reality that its energy demand will 
increase substantially in the future while the available buffer of global excess oil 
production capacity may remain limited, China has aggressively sought to develop 
stronger military, political, and economic ties with Middle Eastern states in order to 
ensure that it will have adequate access to energy in the future. China has even developed 
closer relations with countries that the United States considers to be rogue states. One 
such rogue state that China has expanded its relations with is Iran. Chapter III will 




                                                 
36 Farmer, China's Growing Demand for Oil and its Impact on U.S. Petroleum Markets, 29 
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III. CASE STUDY I – IRAN 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Over the past three decades, the Sino-Iranian relationship has changed 
dramatically. The growing Sino-Iranian relationship has drawn the ire of the United 
States because the U.S.-Iranian relations have been on hostile terms ever since the 1979 
Iranian revolution.37 Shortly following the Iranian revolution, the United States has led 
an isolation and containment policy against Iran in the hopes that the strains imposed on 
it (i.e., economic sanctions) would result in a “break up and gradual mellowing” of its 
government.38 Successive Presidents following President James Carter have continued 
the isolation and containment policy and have also imposed additional sanctions on Iran. 
The U.S.-Iranian relationship hit its lowest point in January 2002 when President George 
W. Bush labeled Iran as part of the “Axis of Evil” during a State of Union address.39  
China’s entry into the Middle East and its close relations with Iran has affected 
how successful the U.S. policy in Iran has been on numerous fronts. The offensive 
realists would believe that China is looking to expand its power and influence in the 
Middle East through Iran, much like the role of proxy states during the Cold War. This 
gain in power and influence would come at the cost of the United States. The economic 
interdependence group would believe that China’s behavior is not driven by a desire to 
challenge U.S. hegemony but is driven by its need for energy. Because China views the 
current Iranian regime as a long term energy partner, it is seeking the regime’s survival 
by providing Iran with much needed economic, military and political support.  
This chapter will examine how the Sino-Iranian relations have evolved in the past 
two decades and how China’s role has affected U.S. policy in the region. The economic 
                                                 
37 Kenneth Katzman, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses (Washington D.C.: Congressional 
Research Service, 2006), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL32048.pdf (accessed February 20, 2007).  - 
Kenneth Katzman’s CRS Report provides excellent analysis on the history of U.S.-Iranian relations. 
38 Herman Franssen and Elaine Morton, "A Review of US Unilateral Sanctions Against Iran," The 
Middle East Economic Survey, August 26, 2002, 1, http://www.mafhoum.com/press3/108E16.htm 
(accessed January 24, 2007). 
39 Bush, President George W., "State of Union Address," White House, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html (accessed January 24, 2007). 
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section will analyze the Sino-Iranian trade, investments, infrastructure/industrial 
development assistance and technology transfer. The military section will examine the: 
(a) amount and variety of Sino-Iranian arms trade and (b) Sino-Iranian military 
technology sharing. The political aspect will discuss the evolution of the Sino-Iranian 
diplomatic relations over the past two decades as well as China’s role in the Iranian 
nuclear crisis.  
The objective of this chapter is to decipher Chinese intentions regarding Iran. If 
China is acting in the offensive realism mold, its actions should be directed towards 
expanding its political, economic, and military influence in the Middle East through Iran 
in an effort to increase its power and influence and to challenge U.S. hegemony. These 
actions may include: (a) playing an active role in building up Iran’s military in order to 
challenge U.S. armed forces, (b) providing strong political support to Iran so they may 
work against U.S. objectives (i.e. unconditional U.N. support for the Iranian nuclear 
program), and (c) providing massive economic support in a manner which may not make 
economic sense for China, but would allow the Iranian regime to challenge the United 
States. In other words, China should be providing economic assistance to Iran with a 
political agenda to challenge U.S. hegemony.   
If China is acting in the economic interdependence mold, China should be taking 
actions to preserve and promote its economic interests in the Middle East. These actions 
should include: (a) providing limited political support to the current Iranian regime with 
the limited objectives to ensure the regime’s survival and to protect Chinese economic 
interests, (b) providing limited military support to Iran to preserve Chinese economic 
interest (i.e. improving Iran’s capability to defend its borders, but not improving it  
enough to challenge the United States thereby promoting instability in the Middle East), 
and (c) taking advantage of economic opportunities in Iran which are mutually beneficial.  
Additionally, if China is acting in the economic interdependence mode, it should be 
taking actions in the international realm to avoid an armed conflict involving Iran which 
would pose risks to Chinese economic interests. This would require China to work 
alongside both the United States and Iran, and its actions should be directed towards 




The United States has used its various elements of national power to influence 
Iran’s future. In the economic realm, the United States has used sanctions in the hopes 
that economic hardship and isolation from the globalized world would cause a regime 
change in Iran. China, viewing Iran as a long term energy supplier, realizes that a regime 
change in Iran would not be in its economic interests; therefore, China has played a vital 
role in helping the Iranian regime survive the U.S. efforts for regime change. This section 
will show that China, in order to increase the likelihood that the Iranian regime survives, 
has not only become a major source of capital but has also provided Iran with assistance 
in industrial and infrastructural development.  
1. Trade 
Over the past two decades, Iran and China have developed a strong economic 
relationship. Sino-Iranian trade has been developing rapidly having grown from $200 
million in 1990 to $10 billion in 2005. Additionally, Iran’s 20-year vision projects the 
annual trade relations between China and Iran to be $25 billion by 2025.40 This trend of 
closer Sino-Iranian trade relations is confirmed in the Direction of Trade Statistics 
published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Chinese exports in 2000 composed 
5.2% of Iran’s total imports which made China the sixth largest exporter to Iran. In 2005, 
Chinese exports increased to 8.3% of Iran’s total imports, making China the second 
largest exporter to Iran. Of the total trade amount, 58-62% of the trade volume has 
consisted of Iranian exports which provide Iran with much needed capital. 
According to the Mehr News Agency, Chinese exports to Iran in 2005 mainly 
comprised of: electric and mechanical machinery, mineral fuels and lubricants, rail 
transportation equipment, iron, steel, plastic, toys, sport equipment, and machinery used 
in the factories and power plants. It also reported that Iranian exports to China mainly  
 
 
                                                 
40 Iran Daily News, "Sino-Iran Trade to Reach $25 Billion," Iran Daily News, sec. 1, June 25, 2006, 
http://www.iran-daily.com/1385/2594/pdf/i1.pdf#search=%22sino%20iranian%20trade%22 (accessed July 
5, 2006). 
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comprised of petrochemical products, crude oil, iron stone, chrome stone, and cast iron.41 
This is not surprising since China views Iran as a source for energy and other natural 
resources. 
The Chinese role in the Iranian economy cannot be understated in terms of the 
Iranian economic health. Iran’s economy is highly dependent on its ability to export oil. 
This is highlighted by the fact that oil exports accounted for 85% of Iran’s export revenue 
in 2006.42 As a result, Iran’s economic growth is closely connected to its level of oil 
revenue.43 The Sino-Iranian trade has allowed Iran to overcome some of the economic 
hardship imposed on it through U.S. sanctions (thereby undermining U.S. objectives).44 
Hossein Shariatmadari, a leading conservative theorist and newspaper editor in Tehran, 
stated that, "Sanctions are not effective nowadays because we have many options in 
secondary markets, like China."45  
In the trade realm, the Sino-Iranian relationship is mutually beneficial. Trading 
with Iran serves three purposes for China: (a) increased trading with Iran is economically 
beneficial for the Chinese economy (i.e. more jobs), (b) trading with Iran provides China 
with much needed energy in order to meet its growing energy demand, and (c) trading 
with Iran provides the Iranian regime with much needed capital and goods in its struggle 
to survive the U.S. efforts for regime change; thereby providing China with a long-term 
energy supplier to sustain its economic growth for years to come.  
                                                  
41 Mehr News Agency, "Iran-China Trade Hit $9.2 Billion in 2005," Mehr News Agency July 9, 2006, 
http://www.payvand.com/news/06/jul/1078.html (accessed August 5, 2006). 
42 Bill Spindle, "Crude Reality: Soaring Energy Use Puts Oil Squeeze on Iran; there is Less to Export 
as Consumers Learn to Love Appliances, Cars," Wall Street Journal, 
http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.nps.edu:8080/pqdweb?index=0&did=1219149531&SrchMode=1&sid=1
&Fmt=4&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1173333166&clientId=11969 
(accessed March 7, 2007). 
43 Economist Intelligence Unit. "Country Briefing: Iran." The Economist. 
http://www.economist.com/countries/Iran/profile.cfm?folder=Profile%2DEconomic%20Data (accessed 
March 7, 2007). 
44 Leverett and Bader, "Managing China-U.S. Energy Competition in the Middle East," Washington 
Quarterly, Winter, 2005, 195, 
http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/fellows/20051216_leverett_bader.pdf (accessed April 12, 2006).  
45 Robin Wright, "Iran's New Alliance with China could Cost U.S. Leverage," Washington Post, sec. 
A, November 17, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A55414-2004Nov16.html 
(accessed May 17, 2006). 
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2. Energy 
Over the last few years, China has progressively imported more oil from Iran as 
indicated in Table 4. While Iran was China’s third leading supplier of crude oil in 2005, it 
temporarily overtook Saudi Arabia as China’s leading supplier of crude oil in 2006.46 In 
addition to importing Iranian crude oil, China has expanded its interests in Iran to include 
oil exploration. Because China’s future economic growth is highly dependent on its 
ability to meet its energy demands, it views energy security as one of the vital issues it 
must address. This section will discuss China’s role in Iran’s energy sector and will also 

























































Table 4.   Top Ten Iranian Crude Oil Export Destinations (barrels 
(bbl)/day) 
Source: Global Trade Information Services, Inc., Global Trade Atlas, July, 200647. 
 
                                                 
46 John Calabrese, China and Iran: Mismatched Partners (Washington D.C.: Jamestown Foundation, 
2006), http://www.jamestown.org/docs/Jamestown-
ChinaIranMismatch.pdf#search=%22Chinese%20investment%20iran%22 (accessed September, 22, 2006). 
47 Energy Information Administration, "Country Analysis Brief: Iran," U.S. Department of Energy, 5,  
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Iran/Oil.html (accessed September 14, 2006). 
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a. Chinese Energy Contracts: 
With the recent volatility in energy prices and with increasing questions 
regarding whether future energy supplies will meet global energy demands, China has 
pursued energy contracts to secure energy supplies directly at the source by obtaining 
rights to the physical production of oil within various countries. While most countries 
purchase oil as a commodity on the international market, these energy contracts allow 
China to lock up energy supplies before it hits the market. Through these energy 
contracts, China believes that it will be less exposed to the vicissitudes of global energy 
markets.48  
Since the early 2000s, China has sought to invest in Iran for oil 
exploration. While China is seeking energy equity deals throughout the world, it is worth 
noting that the energy contracts China signs with Iran are unique. Because Iran does not 
allow foreign companies to own its hydrocarbon resources, it developed a “buyback” 
system. Through this system, a foreign company is allowed to develop an oil field but 
once the field is developed, the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) is given complete 
control.  The foreign company, in return for its investment in developing the oil field, is 
guaranteed a rate of return which is paid in oil. Many western oil companies are wary of 
this buyback system and therefore do not invest in Iran. Should the oil field produce 
above expectations, the buyback system does not allow foreign companies to receive any 
additional benefits. Should the oil field not meet expectations, foreign oil companies can 
be punished. Additionally, since NIOC has complete control of the production facility 
once the oil field is developed, the foreign oil company is unable to safeguard their 
investments.49 Despite these conditions, China has shown a willingness to invest in the 
Iranian energy industry. A brief rundown of the major Sino-Iranian energy contracts is 
listed below50: 
                                                 
48 Dan Blumenthal and Phillip L. Swagel, "Chinese Oil Drill," Wall Street Journal, 
http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.24508/pub_detail.asp (accessed September 4, 2006). 
49 Eurasia Group, China's Overseas Investments in Oil and Gas Production (New York, NY: Eurasia 
Group, 2006), 10, http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2006/oil_gas.pdf (accessed January 24, 2007).  – 
Provides a good description of global Chinese energy investments. 
50 These lists are a summarization of Sino-Iranian energy contracts collected from various sources 
listed in the footnotes.  
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 January 2001: An oil contract between The China Petroleum and 
Chemical Corporation (SINOPEC) and National Iranian Oil Company 
(NIOC) was signed. In this agreement, China agreed to invest $13.25 
million to explore for oil over an area of 4670 km2 of the Zavareh 
region.51 The Zavareh-Kashan exploration block highlights the gamble 
China takes in overpaying for energy contracts. On August 21, 2006, 
reports surfaced regarding the possibility of the Chinese moving on from 
the Zavareh-Kashan exploration block due to the lack of oil. China 
failed to strike any significant amount of oil in four probes of that block. 
The failure of that block raises the failure rate for the initial batch of 
exploration contracts awarded by Iran this decade to 50%.52  
 November 2004: China secured a 50% stake in the Yadavaran oilfields 
(Memorandum of agreement reached in 2004, but the official contract 
has not been signed as of February 2007).53 Numerous issues have 
delayed the signing of this contract. Initially, Sinopec had disagreements 
over the master development plans (which were initially written by 
Iranian officials) for the Yadavaran oil fields.54 The Iranian officials 
were insisting on an eventual output level of 300,000 barrels a day, 
while Sinopec was only willing to commit to 180,000 barrels per day (at 
least initially).55 Additionally, there have been disagreements over the 
rate of return involved with the contract. Sinopec is seeking a higher rate 
of return than what Iran is willing to provide. This shows that despite 
China’s thirst for energy resources, the willingness of China to enter into 
an energy contract with Iran has its limits. 
 January 2005: China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) won the 
rights to explore the Kuhdasht block located on the western side of 
Iran.56  
                                                 
51 Tehran IRNA. "Iran to Allow Chinese Oil Giant to Explore Near Tehran." Tehran IRNA, January 
13, 2001, 2001, Report Number: IAP20010113000002, https://www.opensource.gov (accessed July 16, 
2006). 
52 Vahe Petrossian, "Sinopec Drought on Iran Drilling," Upstream, August 25, 2006, 
http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/chinainstitute/nav03.cfm?nav03=49613&nav02=43873&nav01=43092 
(accessed September 4, 2006). 
53 Beijing Xinhua "China's Sinopec, Iran to Sign Deal to Develop Huge Oil Field in Yadavaran." 
Beijing Xinhua, Report Number: CPP20060915150002,  https://www.opensource.gov (accessed July 16, 
2006). 
54 Reuters News Agency, "Iran Aims to Sign China Yadavaran Oil Deal Soon," Reuters News 
Agency, 
http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/chinainstitute/nav03.cfm?nav03=56327&nav02=43873&nav01=43092 
(accessed February 20, 2007). 
55 Chris Oliver, "Iran, China Reportedly Closer to Oil Deal," CBS Marketwatch, 
http://www.marketwatch.com/News/Story/Story.aspx?guid=%7BA8670494-5595-4FF3-BA83-
8FBD9B147D3E%7D&siteid=google&keyword= (accessed June 5, 2006). 
56 Tehran Mehr News Agency, "Iran's NIOC Finalizes Contracts for Thai, Chinese Companies to 
Explore Oilfields." Tehran Mehr News Agency, June 11, 2005. Report Number: IAP20050611009005, 
https://www.opensource.gov (accessed July 17, 2006). 
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 January 2006: Iran’s North Drilling Company and China Oilfield 
Services Ltd. signed an oil exploration agreement where China Oilfield 
Services would invest $33 million for the management, agreement, and 
maintenance of the Alborz semi-floating platform. This agreement will 
allow Iran to explore the deep waters of the southern Caspian Sea. The 
Chinese company was selected due to its “technical capabilities and 
more reasonable offer in comparison with its European rivals.”57  
 June 2006: Sinopec and NIOC signed the Garsmar contract which 
obligated China to invest at least $19.61 million in exploration 
operations, with complementary operations costing $38.95 million. 
Should hydrocarbons be found in the region, Chinese investment into 
the project could skyrocket to $58.56 million.58  
China has also signed contracts in Iran encompassing natural gas reserves. 
Due to environmental concerns, China has recently taken a strong interest in natural gas 
resources. Below is a brief rundown of Sino-Iranian natural gas contracts:  
 March 2004: Zhuhai Zhenrong Corporation (a Chinese state-owned oil 
trading company) signed a 25-year Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) 
contract. Over the lifetime of the LNG contract, China will import 110 
million tons of LNG.  
 November 2004: SINOPEC secured another massive contract with Iran 
in November 2004. It was awarded a massive $100 billion contract to 
buy 10 million tons of LNG per year for 25 years and was also awarded 
with a 50% stake in the Yadavaran oil fields. When examining this deal, 
Iran’s main objective for the contract seems to be to secure long term 
markets for its natural gas, and the development of the Yadavaran oil 
fields was thrown in as an additional incentive for China to sign the 
contract.59 
The importance of the Sino-Iranian oil contracts cannot be easily 
dismissed. Because some of Iran’s oilfields have already hit their plateau and their oil 
production is decreasing, it is vital that Iran increases its recovery rates in these oil fields 
(which require massive amounts of capital and technologies).60 Energy industry experts 
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estimate that Iran needs between $100-120 billion to help adequately develop its oil fields 
and to get its oil production back on track.61 The Chinese energy contracts provide Iran  
with a portion of that much needed capital. 
b. Assessment of Chinese Energy Security Approach 
While China has invested heavily in these oil exploration contracts, it is 
well aware that there is no guarantee that these contracts will pay off. In order to lock up 
energy sources, SINOPEC and CNPC have outbid other international energy companies 
for the rights of exploration in Iran. Additionally, China and Iran signed a number of 
these contracts when energy prices were at an all-time high which further increased the 
prices of these oil contracts; however, China was still willing to enter into these oil 
contracts believing that they would strengthen Chinese energy security. There is currently 
much debate as to whether or not these contracts make economic sense.   
Some energy experts believe that China’s approach to secure long term 
contracts makes sense.62 In their eyes, energy security is very difficult to predict. While 
the world currently has enough energy to meet demand, this may not always be the case. 
Numerous experts have argued that the world’s ability to produce oil is reaching its peak. 
As a result, the world’s ability to provide cheaply recoverable oil to meet energy demand 
will be limited in the future.63 Additionally, energy supplies and prices are highly 
dependent on factors that are difficult to foresee (i.e., political instability). Should these 
factors cause an energy scarcity in the future, China’s strategy to secure energy sources 
by overpaying for energy contracts now may very well be effective.64 By overpaying for 
energy contracts now and assuming that Iran possesses as much energy as China believes, 
it may be guaranteed access to energy in the future if a scenario arises where global 
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energy supplies do not meet energy demand.65 This scenario is also contingent on the fact 
that Iran does not hedge on its obligations like Russia has with Belarus and Ukraine.  
On the other hand, many energy experts that believe that the Chinese 
approach to secure energy sources does not make economic sense. These experts believe 
that “equity barrels” (those that China secures directly from the source) do not provide 
any greater energy security than purchasing oil from the global market.66 Regardless of 
the type of oil (equity or market oil), the price of oil will increase if there is a geopolitical 
event that affects oil supplies (i.e. regional war, political instability, ethnic conflict). To 
these experts, China’s belief that equity oil deals will provide greater energy security is 
based on a view of the pre-1970s energy market. Because today’s global energy market is 
much more dynamic and flexible, no major oil consuming nation has suffered an oil 
shortage or supply disruption.67  Even within China, there have been a growing number 
of people who are voicing their disagreement regarding China’s strategy to enter into oil 
equity deals. They contend that these oil equity deals provide China with only a fraction 
of the oil it imports, and therefore cannot help China in a time of energy supply 
disruption.68 
Additionally, many of these experts not only believe that China’s 
approach to develop these energy contracts does not make economic sense, but can have 
repercussions for countries throughout the world. It is worth noting that when Chinese 
companies bid for energy contracts, they have an unfair advantage over their Western 
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competition. Part of the reason why Chinese oil companies are able to outbid Western 
companies may be the fact that unlike Western oil companies, Chinese oil companies 
have access to government coffers.69 The U.S. Department of Energy views China’s 
willingness to overpay for crude oil and other energy resources as a vital concern because 
China’s willingness “to put aside market principles” in order to secure energy contracts 
have a distorting effect on global energy prices.70 Peter C. Evans’ and Erica S. Downs’ 
policy brief titled "Untangling China’s Quest for Oil through State-backed Financial 
Deals” examines the assistance provided to the state owned oil companies by the Chinese 
government. Not only does the government provide the state owned oil companies with 
capital, but it also uses the state owned China Development Bank and China Export-
Import Bank to provide the oil companies with: (a) extensions in their lines of credit, and 
(b) below-market interest rates on loans.  
c. U.S. Reaction to Sino-Iranian Energy Deals 
The United States has approached China regarding the Sino-Iranian oil 
equity deals. In February 2004, the United States embassy in China raised its concerns 
regarding the effects China’s investments in Iran have on the U.S. policies. China’s 
response to the U.S.’s concerns was that it was intent on continuing its efforts in Iran, 
which included its bidding to develop 16 Iranian oilfields.71 On December 28, 2006, the 
U.S. Embassy warned China that there would be repercussions should CNOOC sign a 
proposed $16 billion gas deal with Iran.72 Some Congressional lawmakers have discussed 
the possibility of enforcing some of the measures of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act should 
CNOOC sign the gas contract. China responded to the U.S. warning by stating that the 
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gas deal was legitimate and that the United States should stop interfering in Sino-Iranian 
trade affairs.73 Despite U.S. pressure, China is intent on furthering its investments in Iran.  
d. Summary 
While this section does indicate closer Sino-Iranian economic ties, there 
are numerous indications that China does have a limit as to how close it will become with 
Iran within the energy realm.  
 
Table 5.   Chinese Global Oil Investments (as of 2006) 
Source: National Bureau of Asian Research74 
 
This section has highlighted two vital trends in Sino-Iranian relations. 
First, the sheer number of energy contracts and the amount of money China has invested 
in Iran indicate that it views Iran as a long term energy supplier. As a result, it is seeking 
the Iranian regime’s survival even if it undermines U.S. objectives. If China does not 
view the current Iranian regime as a long term energy supplier, the massive long-term 
energy deals do not make much sense (i.e. 25-year natural gas contract).  
Secondly, while China is seeking the survival of the Iranian regime, it has 
also shown a willingness to limit the extent of the Sino-Iranian economic relationship. 
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This is indicated by two things. First, China has made no secret of its desire to keep its 
energy sources diversified despite Iran’s desperate need for capital and technology. As 
Table 5 (above) shows, China has invested over $7 billion in oil exploration and 
development of oilfields in Nigeria, Syria, and Kazakhstan during the first six months of 
2006 alone.75 Secondly, China has also shown an unwillingness to enter into energy 
contracts unless it is deemed economically beneficial enough from the Chinese 
viewpoint. As stated earlier, it is peculiar that the Yadavaran oilfield contract has yet to 
be signed by both parties even though a memorandum of understanding was reached over 
two year ago. The fact that the Yadavaran agreement has taken over two years to finalize 
shows that China will not enter into an arrangement that it does not feel is mutually 
beneficial. From this action, it is clear that China will not arbitrarily provide Iran with 
capital just for the sake of assisting the Iranian economy. 
3. Technology Transfer 
China realizes that if Iran is to be a long term energy supplier to China, it must 
have a strong economy. Having a stronger economy would further increase the likelihood 
of regime survival. While this undermines U.S. objectives, China is willing to look past 
U.S. objections in order to secure energy sources. In the late 1980s, a pattern was 
established regarding Sino-Iranian economic relations. In order to assist Iran with its 
postwar reconstruction effort, China agreed to supply industrial equipment, technology 
and engineering services in return for Iranian oil.76  John Garver’s book “China and Iran: 
Ancient Partners in a Post Imperial World” provides an excellent analysis on the 
assistance China has provided to Iran outside of the energy sector. 
Over time, China has provided Iran with a great deal of assistance establishing 
their industries. Much of this assistance has not only been technical assistance. The sheer 
amount of manufacturing equipment sent to Iran has also played a role in the 
development of Iranian industries. In 1989, a memorandum of understanding was signed 
between Iran and China regarding the transfer of technology in the following areas: 
power station equipment (joint project to manufacture two 300-megawatt thermal power 
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plants), sugar making machinery, papermaking machinery (joint project to create one 
paper factory), and machine tools and engineering machinery manufacturing 
equipment.77 The machinery for the sugar refining plants and crane trucks for these 
projects were to be manufactured in Iran with Chinese assistance.78 Additionally, during 
the same timeframe, research centers in China (particularly in Chinese machine-tool-
building) began to cooperate with Iranian factories located in Iran.79 In 1991, China and 
Iran signed another memorandum of understanding establishing joint industrial design 
and engineering companies. In 2003, China and Iran further expanded their joint ventures 
when two Chinese auto manufacturers established auto factories in Iran.  The Shanghai 
Automobile Industry Corporation (SAIC) set up a factory in Mashhad while First Auto 
Works (FAW) set up a factory in Esfahan. Through this agreement, SAIC was to provide 
Iran with technology, design assistance, auto parts, and marketing support.80 As a result 
of these projects, Iran was able to acquire a vast amount of skill and technology. While 
Iran may have been able to secure these technologies from European companies, the 
Iranians preferred to deal with Chinese companies. The Chinese showed a willingness to 
fulfill contracts and transfer technology at rates which were substantial less expensive 
than western companies. For example, in the first phase of the Tehran metro system, 
Chinese companies were willing to take on the project at 25% of the cost of western 
companies.81 
What is interesting about China’s assistance in these projects is that it was willing 
to transfer technology to Iran that it only recently acquired itself. SAIC transferred 
manufacturing technology and modern automobile design techniques which it acquired 
from General Motors (United States) and Volkswagen (Germany) during the 1990s.82 
The willingness to transfer advanced technology to Iran existed in other sectors also. In 
1989, China signed an agreement with Iran which allowed Iran access to ion beam 
implantation technology, which was used in their metal industry. The ion beam 
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implantation technology was only recently acquired by China in the 1980s.83 While this 
is a mutually beneficial relationship in which China received oil and capital while Iran 
received technology, the fact that China was willing to transfer such new technologies 
emphasizes the importance it places on the Sino-Iranian relationship.  
4. Infrastructure Improvement 
Both China and Iran realized the importance of infrastructure to industrial 
development. In this sense, Iran has looked towards China to play a vital role in the 
improvement of Iran’s infrastructure.84 While some of the projects China has carried out 
in Iran have already been discussed, there have been numerous other joint projects 
improving Iran’s infrastructure. In 1989, China stated that it was prepared to assist 
building four 12-megawatt power plants. In 1995, a Chinese electrical machinery 
manufacturer was awarded a contract to produce four 320-megawatt thermo-electrical 
power generators.85  Additionally in 1996, two other power plants were completed with 
Chinese assistance. One was a 10-megawatt hydropower and the other was a 325-
megawatt thermal power generating facility.86 Since 2001, there have been seven 
additional joint projects to improve Iran’s electrical services. 
In addition to improving Iran’s electricity production, China has assisted in 
improving Iran’s transportation sector. The vital role that the transportation sector plays 
in economic development was highlighted by China during a meeting between Iran’s 
transportation minister Ahmad Khorram’s and Beijing’s Vice Premier Huang Ju. In 1996 
China and Iran completed a railway line which linked Iran and Central Asia. During the 
building of this railway, China supplied technical experts, a provision of railway parts 
and also transferred various technologies.87 China also played a vital role in the Tehran 
Metro Project. The Tehran Metro Project developed two unique characteristics in joint 
Sino-Iranian ventures: (a) joint acquisition of advanced technology, and (b) large scale 
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Chinese financial support (which will be discussed in the following section).88 In 
developing the Tehran Metro system, China did not have certain technologies that 
Western companies possessed. Particularly, China needed improvements in the following 
areas: (a) braking, (b) signaling, (c) ventilation, and (d) manufacturing workshops. By 
taking on the Tehran Metro Project, China had a strong incentive to acquire these 
technologies, modernize its own manufacturing factories, and then use these factories to 
produce modern components for the Tehran metro. The Chinese then agreed to pass on 
these new technologies to Iranian industries. As a result of this partnership, not only did 
the Tehran Metro Project provide China with new technologies, but Iran was also 
provided with these new technologies which helped their domestic industries89. 
Outside of railway production, China is also assisting in developing other areas 
within Iran’s transportation sector. As of 2004, the Chinese were assisting in the 
construction of a highway between Tehran and Chalus, which is located on the Caspian 
Shore. When completed, this roadway will allow people to commute more easily between 
Tehran and Chalus and would play a role in Iran’s effort to strengthen its role in the 
growing Caspian regional economy.90  
There have been other economic sectors in which China has provided minor 
assistance. Agriculture and irrigation have been areas in which Iran has greatly benefited 
from Chinese knowledge and technology transfer. Iranians benefited greatly from 
learning new methods of raising bees, fish, and shrimp. Additionally, Iranian irrigation 
systems were improved using Chinese assistance and technology. In 1995, China 
exported nearly $1 million worth of underwater electrical pumps and control system for 
use in irrigation.91 In addition to transferring relatively advanced technology to Iran, 
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5. Investments/Financing 
The Tehran Metro Project also established another characteristic of joint Sino-
Iranian ventures. In order to complete the Tehran Metro Project, the Chinese had 
underwritten a substantial portion ($1.5 billion) of the project.92 China was willing to 
accept a low return and take a greater financial risk by substantially underwriting the 
Tehran metro project and other joint Sino-Iranian ventures because the projects: (a) 
created jobs in China, (b) provided China with an opportunity to further expand its 
exports to the Middle East, and (c) provided China with a stable strategic and economic 
partner in the Middle East.   
Chinese investments and Sino-Iranian cooperation in Iran’s infrastructure seem to 
be increasing, which may lead to further Iranian domestic industry development. The 
transportation projects Iran is looking to complete in the next few years include: (a) 
production of 600 railway passenger cars, (b) 5,000 freight wagons, (c) ships, (d) 
construction of 5,000km of expressway, (e) construction of 6,000 km railway, (f) seven 
international airports, and (g) three large trade ports. In 2003, China has agreed to invest 
$3-4 billion in Iran’s infrastructure over a three year period.93 
While China has played a vital role in Iran’s economic and infrastructural 
development, it is important to point out that both sides have benefited from these 
infrastructural projects. As mentioned earlier, China is willing to take additional risks that 
western companies do not in order to help Iran; however, it is not willing to take 
substantial economic losses to help Iran develop its economy and infrastructure. When 
this Sino-Iranian infrastructure development relationship began, China made clear that 
while it was willing to assist Iran in its postwar construction “as far as it is able” to, this 
relationship must be “on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.”94  
6. Summary 
As stated earlier, if China is behaving in the offensive realism mold, it should be 
providing massive economic support (despite any economic losses it may incur) in a 
manner which strengthens Iran so that it can challenge the United States. In other words, 
                                                 
92 Garver, China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World, 264. 
93 Ibid., 259. 
94 Ibid., 243. 
34 
China should be providing economic assistance to Iran with a political agenda to 
challenge U.S. hegemony. China’s behavior does not fall into that category. There is no 
question that China’s economic policies toward Iran are undermining U.S. objectives; 
however, the reasons why China is undermining U.S. objectives are not based on  
intensions to expand its power and influence at the cost of the hegemon. Its reasons for 
undermining U.S. objectives are more closely aligned with the economic interdependence 
school of thought.  
China’s reasons for supporting the survival of the current Iranian regime are 
driven by its need for long term energy sources. By providing Iran with: (a) much needed 
capital to circumvent the effects of the U.S. sanctions, (b) technology to improve the 
Iranian infrastructure and industries, and (c) various other investments, China has 
attempted to increase the survivability of the Iranian regime which they view as a long 
term energy partner. Despite the fact the Chinese goals are in conflict with U.S. 
objectives and policies, there are numerous aspects of the Chinese behavior which are 
inconsistent with the offensive realism framework. 
First, if China is acting in the offensive realism mode, it should be attempting to 
strengthen and expand their influence in Iran at every opportunity. The limits China has 
imposed on the Sino-Iranian relationship indicate that its approach toward Iran is not 
intended to expand its power at the cost of the hegemon, but is based on economic 
reasons. As stated earlier, China realizes the dangers of becoming overly reliant on a 
single country to meet its rising energy demands. This is validated by the sheer amount 
energy equity deals it has entered into throughout the world. The fact that China is 
substantially investing in energy resources outside of Iran, despite the Iranian need for 
massive capital and technology in its oilfields, shows that it will limit how much 
assistance it provides to Iran. These actions are more consistent with the economic 
interdependence theory, and not with a state that is looking to expand its power in order 
to challenge the hegemon.  
Secondly, China has emphasized that any economic arrangement it enters into 
with Iran must be “on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.” This statement indicates 
that China is not willing to assist Iran unless it also benefits economically. China is 
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clearly looking at Iran as a business partner as opposed to a state that can assist it to 
decrease U.S. power and influence in the Middle East. An example that illustrates this 
Chinese stance is the delay in the signing of the Yadavaran oil contract. Despite its 
growing energy demand and Iran’s need for capital, China has been unwilling to sign the 
Yadavaran agreement. Initially, China refused to sign the agreement because it was not 
presented with what it considered an acceptable master development plan. Now, China is 
unwilling to sign the contract due to issues over the rate of return it would receive from 
the deal. This indicates that China is content with taking over two years to finalize the 
Yadavaran agreement in order to reach what it deems as a favorable agreement. Should 
the terms of the energy agreements not be beneficial to China as Chinese officials desire, 
it is content with not finalizing the agreements until its demands are addressed. This 
behavior does not fit well with a state that is seeking to strengthen Iran to challenge U.S. 
hegemony. China’s behavior is be driven by economic interests, which is closely aligned 
with the economic interdependence model. 
Another reason to be cautious about labeling China as acting in the offensive 
realism mold is the fact that China’s behavior is not unique by any means. There are 
numerous other countries that also invest and trade heavily with Iran which would not be 
considered as behaving in the offensive realism mold. For example, prior to China 
becoming Iran’s number one customer for oil, Japan, which is a close U.S. ally, has 
traditionally occupied that spot. Additionally, other traditional U.S. allies such as South 
Korea, Turkey, Taiwan, and various European Union (E.U.) nations continue to invest in 
and purchase substantial amounts of energy from Iran.95 Interestingly, the United States 
has not raised any massive public concerns regarding these countries’ contribution to 
sustaining the Iranian regime as it has with China’s involvement.  
If China was behaving in the offensive realism mold and wanted Iran to challenge 
the United States, it should be: (a) providing Iran with massive economic support 
regardless of whether it makes economic sense (attached with a political agenda to 
challenge U.S. hegemony), and (b) expanding its ties with Iran at every opportunity 
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which it has not done. Instead, this case study has shown that China is not taking  
actions as offensive realists would anticipate. 
C. MILITARY 
In his 2002 regime change speech, President George W. Bush left all options open 
regarding the avenues it would pursue to confront regimes which he considered to be 
threats to the United States. He specifically highlighted the use of military action to meet 
U.S. objectives of a stable Middle East; therefore, any country providing advanced 
military equipment to Iran could be viewed as working against the United States and its 
objectives.  
1. Arms/Technology Export 
In the military realm, China has assisted Iran in numerous facets; however, the 
main Sino-Iranian cooperation in the military realm revolves around military arms sales 
and technology sharing. While Russia is Iran’s main weapons supplier, China has been a 
steady arms provider to Iran. Table 6 shows the amount of weapons China has transferred 
to Iran between 1995 and 2005, while Table 7 provides a breakdown of what exactly has 
been transferred to Iran. China’s arms export to Iran concerns the United States in two 
areas: (a) assistance in developing Iran’s asymmetric capability, and (b) sale of battlefield 
and cruise missiles, and missile production technology to Iran.96  
First, the United States’ concerns with Chinese assistance in developing Iran’s 
asymmetric capability revolve around: (a) the possibility of the Iranians disrupting 
maritime shipping through the Straits of Hormuz, and (b) the increased threats that are 
posed to U.S. naval forces operating in the Middle East.97 Throughout the 1990s, China 
has continued to supply Iran with anti-ship missiles such as the C-701, C-801, C-802, FL-
6, TL-10/FL-8, TL-6/FL-9. Additionally, China has sold various Fast Attack Crafts to 
Iran (See Table 7). This concerns the United States because Iran has shown its 
willingness to use Chinese weapons against U.S. naval forces. During the 1980s, Iran 
used Chinese Silkworm missiles against U.S. warships operating in the Persian Gulf.  
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Table 6.   Amount of Chinese Arms Sales to Iran: (1995-2005) 98 
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute99 
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5 F-7M Airguard Fighter Aircraft 1995 1995 5 
9 Y-12 Transport Aircraft 1993 1994-95 9 
2 Y-7 Transport Aircraft 1994 1998 2 
25 CSS-8 TEL SSM Launcher 1989 1990-96 25 
40 C-701/FL-10 Anti-Ship Missile 1998 2001-04 40 
24 C-801/CSS-N-4 Sardine Anti-Ship Missile 1992 1996 24 
100 C-801/CSS-N-4 Sardine Anti-Ship Missile 1992 1995-6 100 
24 C-801/CSS-N-4 Sardine Anti-Ship Missile 1996 1997-99 24 
N/A 
C-802/CSS-N-8 
Saccade Anti-Ship Missile 1992 1994-2005 240 
200 CSS-8 TEL SSM   1989 1990-96 200 
N/A FL-6 Anti-Ship Missile 2000 2002-05 85 
N/A TL-10/FL-8 Anti-Ship Missile 2002 2004-05 20 
N/A TL-6/FL-9 Anti-Ship Missile 2003 2005 10 
7 China Cat Type FAC(M) 2000 2001-04 7 
10 Hudong Class FAC(M) 1992 1994-96 10 
 
Table 7.   Breakdown of Major Chinese Arm Sales to Iran: (1995-2005) 
Source:  Stockholm International Peace Research Institute100 
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Although the United States views China’s arms sales to Iran with caution, the 
Chinese government has not exported a single weapon to Iran that violates international 
agreements, or any weapon that would dramatically increase Iran’s military capabilities 
against the United States and its allies101. Additionally, as Table 6 shows, China has not 
substantially increased its arms export to Iran between 1997 and 2005.102 China has also 
shown a willingness to cooperate with the United States over arms proliferation. In 1989, 
China cooperated with the United States and promised to stop selling Silkworm missiles 
to Iran, albeit under the threat of U.S. sanctions. It also provided the United States with 
the technical information to defeat those missiles. Additionally, in November 2000, 
China promised to develop export control regimes and also promised to work to prevent 
the proliferation of various missile technologies.103 As a result of these promises, the 
Clinton administration pledged to resume exporting satellites to China and also waived 
missile proliferation sanctions against China.104 China’s willingness to cooperate with the 
United States if it feels that the Sino-U.S. economic relationship is about to be 
substantially damaged highlights the vital role economic matters play in influencing 
Chinese actions. 
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Secondly, the United States has been concerned regarding Chinese companies 
transferring missile technology to Iran. The United States has sanctioned Chinese 
companies for transferring sensitive technologies to Iran like guidance, solid propellant 
motor, and telemetry technologies. The China North Industries Group (NORINCO) has 
been sanctioned by the United States three times in 2003 alone.105 Shirley A. Kan’s 
Congressional Research Service report titled “China and Proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues” provides a timeline of reported Chinese 
missile technology proliferation to Iran. 
 Mid 1994-1995: CIA reported that China provided Iran with dozens (if not hundreds) of 
missile guidance systems and computerized machine tools. (International Herald Tribune 
– June 23, 1995) 
 August 1996: CIA reported that China agreed to provide Iran with gyroscopes, 
accelerometers, and test equipment which may be used for missile guidance systems. 
(Washington Post – November 21, 1996) 
 September 1997: U.S. and Israeli intelligence sources report that China provided Iran 
with telemetry equipment used in test flights for the Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 missiles. 
(Washington Times – September 10, 1997) 
 May 1998: U.S. intelligence report states that China discussed selling telemetry 
equipment to Iran. (Washington Post – June 16, 1998)  
 Throughout 1999: U.S. sources believe that Chinese companies still continued to sell 
missile technology (i.e. telemetry and specialty steel) to Iran. (Washington Times – April 
15, 1999) 
 November 21, 2000: The Clinton administration announces that Chinese companies had 
transferred other missile components (Category II items) to Iran. 
  January 2001: Washington Times reported that NORINCO transferred specialty metals 
and chemicals used for missile production to Iran. (Washington Times – January 26, 
2001) 
 May 9, 2002: The Bush administration imposed sanctions against eight Chinese entities 
for violating the Iran Nonproliferation Act. The United States insisted that these eight 
entities had provided Iran with small boats armed with anti-ship cruise missiles.  
 July 9, 2002: The Bush administration sanctioned the China Shipbuilding Trading 
Company for “knowingly and materially contributing to the proliferation of destabilizing 
numbers and types of cruise missiles to Iran.”106  
 May 23, 2003: The Bush administration imposed sanctions against NORINCO on the 
grounds that it had provided Iran with missile technology. 
 June 26, 2003: The Bush Administration imposed sanctions on five Chinese companies 
(including NORINCO) on the grounds that they provided missile technologies to Iran. 
 April 1, 2004: The Bush administration imposed sanction on five additional Chinese 
companies for missile technology proliferation to Iran. 
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 September-December 2004: The Bush administration imposed various sanctions on 
NORINCO, the Xinshidai Company, and other Chinese entities on the grounds that they 
violated that Iran Nonproliferation Act.  
 December 2005: The Bush administration imposed more sanctions on NORINCO and 
five other Chinese entities on the grounds that they proliferated missile and Chemical 
weapons technology to Iran. 
 June 13, 2006: The Bush administration imposed more sanction on previously sanctioned 
Chinese companies for proliferating missile technologies to Iran.107 
Despite repeated U.S. sanctions on Chinese companies, the Chinese government 
may not be responsible for some of the proliferation activities. There are experts that 
question how much control the Chinese government has over its companies. Even the 
U.S. State Department acknowledges that the relationship between proliferating entities 
and the Chinese government is confusing. Paula A. DeSutter, the Assistant Secretary for 
Verification and Compliance in the State Department, stated that “many (proliferating) 
entities appear to be organizations with direct ties to the Chinese government while some 
appear to have a more tenuous relationship with the Central government.”108  
Another factor to consider regarding Chinese companies’ proliferation activities is 
that China may currently lack the ability to effectively control its exports. Export control 
is a relatively new challenge that China is attempting to address; therefore, it will take 
time for China to adequately develop a comprehensive export control system. Some of 
the challenges that the Chinese export control system faces are: (a) inadequate personnel 
and equipment (i.e. X-ray devices), (b) limited ability to investigate export control 
violations (China still relies on western intelligence data), and (c) the lack of a 
comprehensive database tracking export licenses and end user/uses verification. While 
China is taking steps to improve its export control system (i.e. increasing training of 
personnel, conducting joint U.S.-China export control conferences, creating a 
comprehensive export control database), it will take some time for China’s export control 
system to meet U.S. expectations.109  
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China is also taking a more proactive approach on the international realm to limit 
technology transfer.  In 1992, China agreed to abide by the original 1987 Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines and parameters, and in 2000 Beijing 
issued export control laws regulating the transfer of missile technologies for the first 
time.110  
2. Nuclear Assistance 
While China has continued to provide arms to Iran, the United States has 
criticized it for providing nuclear technology to Iran. The United States has repeatedly 
accused China of not doing enough to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction.  
China’s involvement in Iran’s nuclear program can be traced back to the 1980s. 
During the mid-1980s, China was reportedly training Iranian personnel in nuclear 
technology. Additionally, China and Pakistan signed nuclear cooperation agreements 
with Iran in 1987 and 1990. Through these agreements, China promised to deliver a 
27KW Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) and two 300MW Qinshan power 
reactors. It is important to note that the reactors that China would provide Iran were to be 
under IAEA safeguards, thereby reducing the concerns that Iran would use them to 
develop nuclear weapons.111 While some may interpret the Chinese nuclear assistance as 
China’s determination to see a nuclear Iran, it has cooperated with the United States on 
this nuclear front.112    In a press statement released by the U.S. National Security 
Advisor Sandy Berger in October 1997, China provided assurances to the United States 
that it would not engage in any new Sino-Iranian nuclear cooperation, and that other than 
two existing projects (a small research reactor and zirconium production facility) all 
existing Sino-Iranian nuclear cooperation projects would end.113 As a result  
of its willingness to cooperate with the United States, China did not follow through with 
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its promises to provide Iran with two power plants, plutonium-producing research 
reactor, and uranium conversion plant, etc.114  
In addition to cooperating with the United States over Iran’s nuclear plants, China 
has taken steps to come more in line with the international norms regarding the 
proliferation of WMD technology. On March 9, 1992, China acceded to the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty, and in September 1996 China signed the CTBT.115 
Additionally, in 1996 China agreed to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime 
guidelines (MTCR). The Chinese approach to nuclear nonproliferation took a more 
encouraging direction when China released the White Paper on Nonproliferation on 
December 3, 2003. In this paper China: (a) embraced multilateral export regimes which it 
previously criticized, (b) acknowledged the need for improved transparency of its export 
control system, and (c) indicated that export controls warrant the attention of the State 
Council (implying that at least some of China’s top leaders take the export controls issue 
seriously).116 Another interesting aspect of the 2003 White Paper is that it did not 
criticize the United States as previous White Papers have. Instead, this White Paper 
seemed to be written to address the demands the United States has made on China for 
more transparent and straightforward nonproliferation policies.117  
Recently, the focus of attention over the Iranian nuclear issue has not been the 
transfer of technology or material delivery but has been over China’s role in the 
international political realm revolving around Iran’s nuclear program. This topic will be 
discussed in the political section. 
3. Summary 
While China’s role in assisting Iran’s military can be interpreted by some as 
China’s intention to undermine U.S. objectives in the Middle East and expand its powers 
in the Middle East as the offensive realists may suggest, the evidence proves ambiguous 
at best. First, Chinese arms sales to Iran has not increased substantially in the past decade. 
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As Table 6 shows, Chinese arms sales to Iran between 1997-2005 have remained steady. 
If China is truly acting in the offensive realism mold and is looking to make Iran stronger 
in order to decrease U.S. power and influence in the Middle East, it should be heavily 
encouraging Iran to purchase massive amounts of advanced Chinese military goods – 
which it has not. Additionally, China has listened to U.S. concerns regarding the sales of 
advanced military hardware to Iran. As stated earlier, the Chinese government has not 
exported any military hardware that could change the regional balance of power or pose a 
substantially greater risk to U.S. forces operating in the area.  
Secondly, while Chinese companies may have exported missile technologies to 
Iran, the Chinese government’s awareness of and/or involvement in these technology 
transfers is unknown. This makes it more difficult to determine the true intensions of the 
Chinese government; however, China has gravitated closer towards the international 
approach regarding nonproliferation. China has acceded to the NPT, signed the CTBT, 
and pledged to abide by the original 1987 MTCR guidelines. By signing on to these 
agreements, China has stated that WMD proliferation, including to Iran, is not in global 
interests and it desires to preserve the status quo in the Middle East. China’s release of 
the 2003 White Paper on nonproliferation indicates that China is taking further steps to 
cooperate with the United States. This White Paper marked a change in Chinese 
nonproliferation policies which now emphasizes export controls and a more active 
approach to WMD nonproliferation. These actions are not consistent of a state acting in 
the offensive realism mode. If China viewed the United States as a hegemon it seeks to 
usurp power from, it would most likely be refusing to cooperate with the United States 
and taking steps to assist the Iranian military and nuclear program. 
The Chinese approach to Sino-Iranian military ties is geared towards preserving 
the status quo as opposed to expanding its influence in the region at the cost of the United 
States. Realizing that: (a) an armed conflict involving Iran, and (b) antagonizing the 
United States are not in its economic interests, China has refrained from providing Iran 
with advanced military equipment to challenge the United States. Additionally, its 




nonproliferation stance as time passes. These actions are more consistent with a state 
behaving in the economic interdependence model rather than the offensive realism 
model.   
D. POLITICAL 
Since China realized it would have to rely on foreign energy sources, it has 
progressively developed closer political relations with governments in the Middle East. 
The frequency of visits between diplomats of these two countries started to increase in 
the early 1990s. 
1. Diplomatic Ties 
Since the early 1990s, Sino-Iranian diplomatic visits have increased. Although 
China did not become a net importer until 1993, it realized that it was importing more 
energy from foreign sources prior to that and thus felt that it needed to develop closer 
political ties with its energy suppliers. Since 1991, various Iranian diplomats have visited 
China on nine occasions while various Chinese diplomats have visited Iran on seven 
occasions.118  
Additionally, Iran has recently pushed very strongly to develop closer political 
relations with China in other ways. Since 2004, Iran has been making a strong case to 
join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).  The SCO is an organization that was 
established in 2001 whose main purpose was to resolve border disputes and foster  
closer cooperation in security matters among its members.  The scope and objectives  
of the SCO has since expanded beyond the original purpose to include fostering  
closer cultural and economic cooperation.119  Many Iranians view China and the SCO  
as a counterweight to U.S. hegemony in the region and a potential guarantor of  
future security. 120   As one article puts it, China’s rise in global power and closer  
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relations with Middle East countries allows Iran to take the approach of “to  
hell with the United States and the West.”121  
China’s entry into the Middle East allows Iran to have a superpower ally against 
the United States, thereby reducing the amount of power and influence the United States 
has in the Middle East. Offensive realists may view the possible expansion of the SCO as 
China attempting to gain more power and influence in the Middle East at the cost of the 
United States; however, this is not the case. If China was looking at the SCO as a way to 
gain more power and influence in the Middle East at the cost of U.S. hegemony, Iran 
should have been offered full membership within the SCO. Iran is currently associated 
with the SCO under an “observer” status and is not a full member of the SCO. These 
actions indicate that China is hesitant about expanding its influence in the Middle East; 
however, SCO members may still provide Iran with invaluable support. The Iranian 
nuclear crisis is a good example of how the rise in China’s influence in the Middle East 
can pose a challenge to U.S. policies and objectives.  
2. Nuclear Dilemma 
Much controversy has brewed over Iran’s quest for nuclear technology in the 
political realm. Iran maintains that its pursuit for nuclear technology is for peaceful 
reasons. On the other hand, the United States and other European nations maintain that 
Iran is attempting to acquire the technology to develop nuclear weapons. The main 
parties that have posed a challenge to the U.S.’s efforts are China and Russia. China’s 
stance on Iran’s nuclear program has consistently been that the issue must be “resolved 
peacefully without coercion.” Up until 2006, China has consistently stated that it felt the 
Iran nuclear crisis should be settled within the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA).  China preferred to have this matter settled within the IAEA because it did not 
want to be put in the position of having to choose between Iran and the United States 
should the issue be referred to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).122 Despite 
its efforts, China could not convince Iran to moderate its stance on the nuclear issue and 
ultimately referred Iran to the UNSC.   
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If China wanted to increase its influence in the Middle East by strengthening Iran 
to challenge U.S. hegemony in the Middle East as offensive realists may assert, it would 
most likely oppose any actions that would: (a) cause economic damages to Iran, and (b) 
prevent Iran from fulfilling its nuclear ambitions. This has not been the case. Despite all 
the indications that a strong Sino-Iranian relations exists, China has shown a willingness 
to take actions against Iranian interests which have included: (a) its decision to refer Iran 
to the UNSC on January 31, 2006, (b) its UNSC vote on December 23, 2006 to impose 
sanctions on Iran, and (c) its March 15, 2007 decision to support additional sanctions on 
Iran. These actions may indicate that China is losing its patience with Iran’s 
“intransigence” and “inflexibility” over the nuclear issue. China may also be concerned 
with the effects that Iran’s actions may have on the international nonproliferation 
regime.123  
Further indicating China’s split with Iran over this nuclear issue, China has 
openly stated that it is against Iran possessing nuclear weapons on numerous occasions. 
Two such incidents are listed below: 
 January 5, 2007: China’s President Hu Jintao advised Iran’s Secretary of National 
Supreme Security Council Ali Larijani to take a “serious response” to the U.N. sanctions 
further indicating that China’s stance on nuclear proliferation is similar to the United 
States’. During the meeting, Hu and China’s State Counselor Tang Jiaxuan both pointed 
out to Larijani that the UNSC Resolution imposing sanctions on Iran was unanimous, 
which included China.124  
 January 9, 2007: During Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s visit to China in January 
2007, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao publicly stated that “Resolution 1737 adopted 
unanimously by the UN Security Council members reflects the concerns of the 
international community about the Iranian nuclear issue." This runs counter to Iran’s 
assertion that the UNSC resolution is a “mere piece of paper.”125 
Further motivating China to take actions against Iran in the nuclear issue may be 
its relations with Saudi Arabia and the United States. China, being economically 
dependent on the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, must balance the Sino-Iranian 
                                                 
123 M. K. Bhadrakumar, "China's Middle East Journey Via Jerusalem," Asia Times, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/IA13Ak02.html (accessed January 23, 2007). 
124 Edward Cody, "China Advises 'Serious Response' by Iran to U.N. Sanctions," Washington Post, 
sec. A, January 06, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/02/15/AR2007021500728.html (accessed January 10, 2007). 
125 Bhadrakumar, "China's Middle East Journey Via Jerusalem." 
47 
relationship with the Sino-U.S. and Sino-Saudi relationships. These actions further align 
China’s actions with the economic interdependence theory.  
Ever since the 1979 Iranian revolution, Iran and Saudi Arabia have had hostile 
relations. Much of this hostility involves the two sects of Islam that these nations are 
associated with. Saudi Arabia is a Sunni country while Iran is a Shi’a country. Further 
stroking the flames of this rivalry was Iran’s attempt to export the revolution to other 
parts of the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia, following Grand Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
rise to power.126 Saudi Arabia has explicitly stated that it is against Iran possessing 
nuclear weapons. Because China views both Saudi Arabia and Iran as important energy 
and trade partners, it is playing a delicate balancing act to not only appease both sides in 
order to remain in their good graces, but also to prevent a scenario which may result in an 
armed conflict involving both parties; therefore, the preservation of the status quo and a 
peaceful Middle East is China’s best option in terms of preserving its Middle Eastern 
economic interests. The Sino-Saudi relationship will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter IV. 
Because China is also dependent on the U.S. economy, it must also balance the 
Sino-U.S. relationship with the Sino-Iranian relationship. While energy security is 
viewed with the utmost importance, China also views its relationship with the United 
States with great importance. Although Sino-Iranian trade has grown at an impressive 
rate reaching $9.5 billion in 2005 and is expected to exceed $10 billion by 2008, it pales 
in comparison to the $202 billion Sino-U.S. bilateral trade in 2005.127 Ever since 2004, 
Chinese officials have made it clear during official visits that China would not sacrifice 
its trade interests with the West (particularly the United States) over Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions.128 While it is clear that China values the Sino-U.S. relationship over the Sino-
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Iranian relationship, China’s ultimate goal is to prevent an armed conflict between the 
two countries since they are both considered to be vital economic partners. China’s 
actions in the UNSC reflect the desire to avoid that scenario by cooperating with both 
sides. 
Additionally limiting China’s support for Iran is the value it places on the 
perception that the international community has of China. China would like to be viewed 
as a “responsible stakeholder” in global affairs and they have shown that they are willing 
to vote against Iranian interests in the UNSC as opposed to simply abstaining from 
casting its vote like it had during the first Persian Gulf War in 1990.129 There have also 
been other indications that the Chinese government is taking the role of the “responsible 
stakeholder” seriously. While the state-owned Chinese oil companies have been looking 
to reach numerous energy agreements with Iran and used the Iranian nuclear crisis as a 
means to get favorable energy prices from the Iranians, the oil companies have met some 
resistance from the Chinese government to approve these deals due to the international 
political pressures it would face. This may indicate that the Chinese government is 
displeased with its state-owned energy companies for touting energy agreements that 
involve Iran.130  
3. Summary 
While there is no denying that Sino-Iranian political relations are becoming closer 
and that China has acted on Iran’s behalf on certain issues pertaining to the Iranian 
nuclear crisis, China has made it clear that there are limitations on what degree it is 
willing to stand by Iran against the international community. While offensive realists will 
assert that China is developing closer political ties with Iran in order to challenge U.S. 
power and influence in the Middle East, much of its political actions point to the 
contrary. If China is acting in the offensive realism mold, it would be expected to 
politically support Iran with the intent of strengthening Iran so that it can challenge U.S. 
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power and influence in the region. This case study has shown that China’s political 
actions do not support Iran in such a manner. 
First, China has limited how intertwined it is willing to become with Iran in the 
political realm. As stated earlier, despite the overtures by Iran to allow it into the SCO, 
China has not allowed Iran to become a full member of the SCO. The Chinese decision to 
not allow Iran into the SCO as a full member is in direct contradiction with the offensive 
realist framework. If China was behaving in the offensive realism mold, it should be 
welcoming this opportunity to further expand the Sino-Iranian relationship by entering 
into a strategic alliance with Iran through the SCO.  
Secondly, while China has acted on behalf of Iranian interests in the UNSC 
during the Iranian nuclear crisis, it has also shown that its support for Iran has its limits. 
China has taken actions against Iran on the UNSC, which have included imposing limited 
economic sanctions on Iran. Additionally, China has publicly opposed Iran possessing 
nuclear weapons. As stated earlier, Chinese officials have publicly warned Iran that it 
should take the international community and UNSC resolutions seriously. These actions 
reflect China’s belief that it is not in its interests for Iran to possess nuclear weapons. 
This Chinese stance is not in line with the offensive realism model. A nuclear Iran would 
certainly mean decreased U.S. hegemony in the Middle East, yet China has refused to 
stand steadfastly by Iran in the international political arena. Instead, China is attempting 
to convince Iran to be more accommodating towards the international community 
regarding its nuclear program.  
China’s actions in the political realm are driven by economic needs. Should an 
armed conflict occur in the Middle East between the United States and Iran in the vicinity 
of the Straits of Hormuz, China realizes that there could be a disruption in energy flow 
destined to China from the Persian Gulf. Additionally, should the United States carry out 
a regime change in Iran as it has in Afghanistan and Iraq, China realizes that the massive 
amount of investments it has made in Iran will likely be lost and it will get nothing in 
return. Therefore, China is playing the role of moderating both sides in order to avoid an 
armed conflict. Sensing the economic costs an armed conflict involving Iran may cause, 
China is seeking to avoid that scenario by: (a) taking actions against Iran in the UNSC, 
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(b) publicly warning Iran regarding its nuclear program, (c) attempting to convince Iran 
to be more flexible with the international community over its nuclear program, and (d) 
voting against any UNSC actions that may cause a regime change in Iran (i.e. severe 
economic sanctions). These Chinese actions fit more closely aligned with the economic 
interdependence model.  
Thirdly, Chinese officials have warned Iran that China is unwilling to jeopardize 
its good economic relations with the United States over Iran. This action shows that its 
decisions are based heavily on economic factors. As stated earlier, China’s trade with the 
United States dwarfs the Sino-Iranian trade and therefore China has made it clear it 
values good Sino-U.S. relations over the Sino-Iranian relations. This stance highlights 
China’s emphasis on economics and does not fit in well in the offensive realism model. 
This case study has shown that China’s actions in the political realm are not in 
line with the offensive realism school of thought. On the contrary, Chinese political 
decisions are heavily driven by economic reasons. China is seeking to preserve the status 
quo where: (a) stable Middle Eastern energy flow to China is maintained, (b) China 
maintains its good economic relations with both the United States and Iran, and (c) 
China’s long term economic interests (energy contracts) are preserved as a result of the 
current Iranian regime remaining in power. Because China is taking actions to avoid an 
armed conflict based on mainly economic reasons, its stance more closely aligns with the 
economic interdependence school of thought rather than the offensive realism school of 
thought. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Developing closer relations with a regime that the United States has made clear 
that it does not want to see remain in power can be viewed as China acting in the 
offensive realism mold. Contrary to U.S. interests, China’s actions are not only sustaining 
the Iranian regime economically by purchasing Iranian oil and investing in the Iranian 
economy, but are also supporting the survival of the Iranian regime militarily and 
politically. Through its support for Iran on the international realm, China’s actions may 
be viewed as an attempt to expand its power and influence in the Middle East at the cost 
of the United States. 
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While China’s policies do pose challenges to the United States, it is not 
intentionally pursuing its policies in order to decrease U.S. hegemony in the Middle East. 
Its actions are driven by economic interests which fit more closely along the line of the 
economic interdependence school of thought. China is pursuing three specific goals in the 
Middle East in terms of Sino-Iranian-U.S. relations.  
First, China is seeking to increase the survivability and security of Iran because it 
views Iran as a long term energy supplier. In order to maintain its phenomenal economic 
growth, China needs long term energy sources which the current Iranian regime provides. 
As stated earlier, China has signed numerous massive energy contracts with Iran, 
indicating its intent for Iran to play a vital role in China’s future energy security. If Iran is 
to continue playing a vital role in Chinese energy security, its current regime must remain 
in power and the Iranian economy must be stable. This case study has shown that China 
has provided Iran with much needed capital, investments, technologies, arms, and 
political support to ensure the survival of the Iranian regime.  
Offensive realists may view China’s actions as an attempt to expand its power and 
influence in the Middle East by undermining U.S. objectives; however, there have been 
inconsistencies with China’s behavior if it is considered to be purely in the mold of 
offensive realism. Economically, China has indicated that its economic support for Iran is 
limited. While China has shown a willingness to take more risks with Sino-Iranian 
business deals, it has also stated that it expects the Sino-Iranian economic relationship to 
be on a “basis of equality and mutual benefit.” Highlighting China’s insistence on 
profitable business dealings with Iran is the delay in energy contracts to be finalized. The 
prime example is the Yadavaran energy contract which has not been signed despite the 
memorandum of understanding being reached over two years ago. China’s insistence that 
Sino-Iranian economic relations must be mutually beneficial is inconsistent with a state 
behaving in the offensive realism mode. If China is behaving as offensive realists 
suggest, it should not be overly concerned with profits. Instead it should be more 
concerned with providing Iran with economic assistance, despite the economic losses it 
may incur, in order to strengthen Iran to challenge the hegemon. This is not the case.  
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Secondly, China is seeking to support the Iranian regime while preserving its 
strong economic ties with the United States and Saudi Arabia. While developing a strong 
Sino-Iranian relationship is economically important, China realizes that strong Sino-U.S. 
and Sino-Saudi economic relationships are also vital to its economy.  
China’s reliance on Saudi oil is one factor that China is taking into account when 
assessing the Sino-Iranian relations. While China is seeking the survival of the Iranian 
regime, it also realizes that supporting the Iranian regime too strongly may potentially 
have a negative affect on Sino-Saudi economic relations. The Saudi kingdom does not 
want to see a strong Iranian regime due to the fact it does not share a warm relationship 
with Iran; therefore, in order to protect its economic relationship with Saudi Arabia, 
China must balance the Sino-Iranian relationship with the Sino-Saudi relationship.  
The Sino-U.S. relationship also plays a vital role in influencing the Sino-Iranian 
relationship. As stated earlier, the Sino-U.S. trade dwarfs the Sino-Iranian trade and 
China has made it clear to Iran that the Sino-U.S. economic relationship is more 
important than the Sino-Iranian economic relationship. To maintain strong Sino-U.S. 
economic relations, China has been active in the Iranian nuclear crisis and has shown the 
willingness to work alongside the United States to reach a compromise. China has shown 
a willingness to work against Iranian objectives over the nuclear crisis (i.e. sanctions) and 
it has also made it publicly clear that it does not believe Iran should possess nuclear 
weapons. Additionally, China has publicly warned Iran that it should cooperate with the 
international community with respect to its nuclear program. Based on these actions, it is 
clear that China desires to moderate the political stances of Iran, the United States, and 
Saudi Arabia in an attempt to maintain its good economic relationship with all parties 
involved and to avoid an armed conflict among them. 
China is also playing a balancing act between Sino-Iranian and Sino-U.S. 
relations in the military realm. If China was acting in the offensive realism mold and is 
attempting to expand its power and influence over the hegemon, it most likely would 
refuse to cooperate with the United States on matters such as missile and nuclear 
technologies proliferation. Additionally, because Iran and the United States are on hostile 
relations, creating a strong Iranian military to decrease and challenge U.S. power and 
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influence in the Middle East would be in China’s interests. China’s behavior does not 
follow this pattern. As this case study has shown, China is providing military support to 
Iran to increase the likelihood that the current Iranian regime survives; however, China 
also realizes the importance of the Sino-U.S. economic relationship and has cooperated 
with the United States regarding the Sino-Iranian military relations by: (a) not supporting 
a nuclear capable Iran, and (b) limiting the variety and amount of arms it exports to Iran.  
Thirdly, an armed conflict in Iran would not only jeopardize Chinese economic 
interests in Iran but would also raise the price of energy worldwide and may even disrupt 
the flow of Middle Eastern energy destined for China due to Iran’s proximity to the 
Straits of Hormuz. For this reason, China is seeking to avoid an armed conflict in the 
Middle East. Specifically with the Iranian nuclear crisis, China has made efforts to 
resolve the situation short of armed conflict. Despite the fact China approved sanctions 
against Iran in December 2006, it resisted U.S. pressure to approve more stringent 
sanctions. Had those harsh sanctions been approved and failed to have the desired result 
of the Iranian regime giving up its nuclear ambitions, the next step may have been an 
armed conflict. By resisting U.S. pressure to take harsher measures against Iran, China is 
attempting to prevent an armed conflict.  
China’s actions in pursuit of these goals indicate that it is behaving more 
consistently with the economic interdependence school of thought. There is no denying 
that China’s actions are undermining U.S. policies and objectives in the Middle East. The 
vital point this case study has made is that China is undermining U.S. objectives not 
because it seeks to challenge U.S. hegemony, but because U.S. objectives are not in line 
with Chinese economic and energy security objectives. China realizes that improving the 
security and survivability of the Iranian regime is in its economic interests, and therefore 
has provided Iran with limited economic, political, and military support. However, China 
also realizes the importance of the Sino-U.S. and Sino-Saudi economic relationships and 
is listening to their concerns regarding the Sino-Iranian relationship. With respect to the 
Iranian nuclear crisis, it is seeking a peaceful resolution that is satisfactory to all sides 
which fits more in line with the economic interdependence theory. China’s actions to 
prevent an armed conflict involving Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the United States are a strong 
indication that it is behaving along the lines of the economic interdependence theory. 
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Additionally, contrary to the offensive realism school of thought, this ordeal has 
increased Sino-U.S. cooperation rather than increasing the Sino-U.S. rivalry. In order to 
avoid a war in the Middle East over the Iranian nuclear crisis, China is working closer 
with the United States in the UNSC in order to diffuse tensions. 
China’s behavior and policies also do not fit in the offensive realism mold in other 
ways. First, China is unwilling to become overly reliant on Iran and has shown restraint 
in how much support it will provide Iran. While there is no denying China is looking for 
long term energy sources, it has also been hesitant to become too reliant on Iranian oil 
and is seeking energy contracts throughout the world. Secondly, China has shown been 
hesitant to expand the Sino-Iranian political relationship. This is reflected by China’s 
refusal to grant full membership to Iran in the SCO. Additionally, China has shown that it 
values the perception the international community has of it and does not want to be 
viewed as “irresponsible” as a result of its staunch support for Iran and its nuclear 
program. All these reasons are inconsistent with the offensive realism school of thought. 
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IV. CASE STUDY II: SAUDI ARABIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Ever since the 1940s, the United States and Saudi Arabia have shared a close and 
mutually beneficial relationship. Economically, Saudi Arabia agreed to play a vital role in 
providing the United States with energy to meets its demands. Militarily, the United 
States provided Saudi Arabia with a security guarantee to protect Saudi Arabia from 
international threats. The security guarantee that the United States provided came to be 
more vital to the Saudis as time passed, particularly after the Iranian Revolution and also 
after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq’s Saddam Hussein. This mutually beneficial 
relationship continues today; however, the attacks on the United States on September 11, 
2001 (9/11) have put a strain on this relationship. The fact that 15 out of the 19 hijackers 
involved in the 9/11 attacks were Saudi natives harmed the U.S.-Saudi relationship. 
Additionally, the rising anti-American sentiment in the Middle East as a result of the 
unpopularity of Operation Iraqi Freedom has further damaged the U.S.-Saudi 
relationship. The strains imposed on the Sino-Saudi relationship have provided China 
with an opportunity to develop closer relations with Saudi Arabia at the cost of U.S. 
hegemony. The vital question regarding the Sino-Saudi relationship is whether China is 
indeed behaving in the offensive realism mold and is taking advantage of the situation to 
expand its power and influence in the Middle East at the cost of the United States.  
 This case study will examine the political, military, and economic relationship 
China and Saudi Arabia has formed over the two decades. The following will be 
examined in the economic realm: (a) trade, (b) energy relations, (c) investments, and (d) 
technology transfer. In the military realm, the variety and amount of arms Sino-Saudi 
arms sales will be examined. Lastly, the evolution of Sino-Saudi political relations over 
the last two decades will be examined to include each side’s perception of the other. 
Additionally, this case study will attempt to decipher Chinese intensions in the 
Middle East regarding Saudi Arabia. If China is acting in the offensive realism mold, it 
should be attempting to expand its power and influence in Saudi Arabia at every 
opportunity with the intent to undermine U.S. hegemony. This would include proactive 
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actions such as: (a) providing Saudi Arabia with massive economic assistance and 
incentives to develop closer Sino-Saudi economic and political ties with the intent to 
degrade the U.S.-Saudi relationship, (b) selling Saudi Arabia sophisticated arms and 
providing security assurances to make Saudi Arabia less dependent on the United States 
and more so on China, and (c) encouraging Saudi Arabia to shift their close political 
relations from the Untied States over to China. If China is acting in the economic 
interdependence mold, it should be: (a) interacting economically with Saudi Arabia in a 
manner which makes economic sense (i.e. profitable), (b) interacting militarily with 
Saudi Arabia in a economically profitable manner and not providing Saudi Arabia with 
massive amounts of advanced military hardware in order to make Saudi Arabia less 
reliant on the U.S. security assurances and arms sales, and (c) developing a Sino-Saudi 
political relationship based on furthering their economic interests and not based on 
degrading the U.S.-Saudi political relationship. 
B. ECONOMIC 
Possessing the largest proven oil reserves in the world, Saudi Arabia has come to 
play a vital role in Chinese energy security. While Sino-Saudi relations can be traced 
back to the mid-1980s, the two countries did not fully establish diplomatic relations until 
1990. Since then, the Sino-Saudi economic relationship has grown at an impressive rate. 
Saudi Arabia is China’s largest trading partner in the Middle East. Between 1990 and 
2000, the bilateral trade between the two countries grew ten-fold to reach $3.098 
billion.131 Bilateral trade between the two countries in 2005 increased further in excess of 
$14 billion.132 
1. Energy 
In 1999, Chinese President Jiang Zemin signed an agreement with Saudi Arabia 
which in his words “inaugurated a strategic oil partnership.” This agreement set forth two 
things: (a) Saudi Arabia would open its domestic oil and gas markets to China with the 
exception of upstream oil exploration and production, and (b) China agreed to open its 
downstream sector to Saudi Aramco. China has recognized Saudi Arabia’s importance in 
                                                 
131 People's Daily, "Chinese State Councilor Hails Chinese-Saudi Economic Ties," People's Daily, 
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the global oil market not only because of its proven oil reserves, but also because it is the 
largest oil exporter in the world as shown in Table 8. Additionally, Saudi Arabia is also 
one of the largest Middle Eastern oil exporters to China. China’s increased reliance on 
Saudi oil is highlighted by the increase in the amount of Saudi oil China has imported 
over the last decade. In 1995 Saudi Arabia was China’s 25th largest exporter of oil but in 






















































Table 8.   2005 Top World Oil Net Exporters  
    Source: Energy Information Administration133 
 
China’s energy ties with Saudi Arabia will most likely expand further in the 
future, particularly in light of China’s decision to develop a strategic oil reserves. These 
reserves are projected to hold a 90 days supply of oil for China based on projected future 
import rates.134 China’s plan to develop its strategic oil reserves involves three phases. 
The first phase is projected to be completed by 2008, and encompasses four storage sites 
(two in the Zhejiang province, one in the Shandong province, and one in the Liaoning 
province). These four storage sites are anticipated to hold over 102 million barrels. The 
specific details for phases two and three have yet to be released, but each phase is 
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134 Christopher J. Neely, "China's Strategic Petroleum Reserve: A Drop in the Bucket," Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/net/20070101/cover.pdf (accessed 
February 28, 2007). 
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planned to increase the strategic oil reserve by over 205 million barrels which will 
increase the total Chinese strategic oil reserve to over 500 million barrels.135 One of the 
storage bases in the Zhejiang province was completed in September 2006.136  
Saudi Arabia may play a vital role in filling China’s strategic oil reserves as 
opposed to Iran, Libya, and Sudan, for which China feels have additional risks associated 
with them.137 According to reports, China has been attempting to negotiate a deal with 
the Saudis to use Saudi oil to fill its strategic oil reserves as early as April 2006.138 This 
is significant because China’s strategic oil reserves may bring Sino-Saudi relations even 
closer. Saudi Arabia has the largest production capacity in the Middle East and has the 
capability to increase its oil production past its OPEC quota in order to help China. 
Should Saudi Arabia decide to produce an additional half a million barrels a day for the 
next three years, that alone would provide China with a three months’ supply of oil 
within its strategic oil reserves.139 This would be possible since as of December 2006, 
Saudi Arabia was not operating at full oil production capacity. In December 2006 and 
January 2007, Saudi Arabia produced 8.8 million barrels/day despite its full production 
capacity being 10.5–11 million barrels/day.140 Additionally, Saudi Arabia is looking to 
expand its oil production capacity. Saudi Aramco’s Senior Vice President of gas 
operations, Khalid al-Falih, stated that Saudi Arabia is in the process of expanding its oil 
production capacity to 12 million barrels/day by 2009 and “if the markets justify it” is 
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able to further increase its oil production capacity to 15 million barrels/day in the future. 
He also stated that by 2006, Saudi Arabia will have 90 drilling rigs in operation which is 
double the number that it operated in 2004.141As a result of Saudi Arabia’s ability to 
export massive amounts of oil, China has already provided Saudi Arabia with privileges 
other countries do not have in terms of collaboration over the creation of the Chinese 
strategic oil reserves.142  
This development is significant because increasing the Saudi oil imports by ½ 
million barrels/day would double the current amount of oil that China imports from Saudi 
Arabia. Should China look to Saudi Arabia in the future to fill its strategic oil reserves, 
then Sino-Saudi economic ties will vastly expand which would not only strengthen the 
Sino-Saudi economic relationship but would also have implications in other realms of the 
Sino-Saudi relationship (i.e. political). This could have repercussions on the U.S.-Saudi 
relationship. Because the Chinese would be importing nearly as much Saudi oil as the 
United States, Saudi Arabia may look at China as an equally valuable customer; hence, 
the United States may lose some influence in how it can influence Saudi energy policies.    
 In addition to purchasing energy from Saudi Arabia, China has expressed interest 
in entering into energy exploration contracts with Saudi Arabia. In April 2006, China was 
awarded a contract to explore and produce natural gas in the Rub al-Khali Basin in Saudi 
Arabia.143 The block that China was awarded covers 24,109 km2 and it stated that initial 
investments may reach in excess of $300 million.144 Over the next decade, the amount of 
Chinese investments in Saudi Arabia is expected to grow.145  
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While there is no denying that China and Saudi Arabia have extensive energy ties, 
it is clear that China is attempting to limit its ties to Saudi Arabia from becoming too 
extensive. Despite Saudi Arabia having the largest proven oil reserves in the world, 
China has shown a desire to keep its energy sources diversified. In 2006, Angola took 
over as the number one oil exporter to China.146 Additionally, with respect to China’s 
efforts to build strategic oil reserves, it is still looking at a variety of possibilities to fill its 
reserves. The Chinese do not seem to be placing much urgency on filling its oil reserves 
for many reasons. First, there is domestic and international concern as to the effects on oil 
prices should China decide to fill its strategic oil reserves at a rapid pace. Instead, China 
is taking a more patient approach by filling its strategic oil reserves gradually over many 
years. Secondly, China is unwilling to pay a high price for oil that will be used to fill its 
strategic oil reserves. Zhang Guobao, the Vice Minister of the Chinese State 
Development and Reform Commission, stated that “it would be a great financial risk for 
China to buy oil at the international market for its strategic reserve program as the current 
global oil price has been fluctuating at a high level.”147 China is content to wait until oil 
prices drop to what they consider an acceptable level prior to importing oil into their 
strategic oil reserves.148 In the meantime, China has started to fill its first strategic oil 
reserve using domestic oil instead of imported oil.149 China also may be looking to fill its 
strategic oil reserves with overseas oil assets that Chinese firms own stakes in.150 
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2. Investments 
While Saudi Arabia’s economy is still heavily reliant on natural resources, it does 
realize the importance of diversification. In October 2002, the Saudi Ministry of 
Economy and Planning held a symposium to address the issue of Saudi development 
strategies. Through this symposium, Vision 2020 was developed which is an “expression 
for the national development strategies of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia up to the year 
2020.”151 In Vision 2020, it states that manufacturing is critical to Saudi Arabia’s future 
progress152 and that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has the responsibility to “build up the 
supply of skills, finance, technology support and infrastructure and other support 
institutions, so that firms have access to the high-quality factor inputs needed to reach 
world-class competitiveness.”153 China is willing to help the Kingdom in both aspects. In 
recent years, Saudi Arabia has invited China to invest and assist in developing Saudi 
Arabia’s massive infrastructure sector and China has shown some interest in doing so. 
With Chinese investments, Saudi Arabia hopes to improve its infrastructure which 
includes a wide range of investment opportunity encompassing gas, water desalination, 
power generation and railways. These projects are worth an estimated $624 billion.154   
Outside of investments in Saudi Arabia’s infrastructure, China has expressed interest in 
investing in certain industries within Saudi Arabia. China has already invested over $4 
billion in Saudi Arabia’s refinery to produce alumina or aluminum oxide.155  
Saudi Arabia is particularly eager to attract Chinese investments in its 
petrochemical industry. The governor of the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority 
(SAGIA), Amr Al Dabbagh, made clear that Saudi Arabia intends to be a major player in 
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the global petrochemical industry when he laid out Saudi Arabia’s goal of: (a) capturing 
15% of the global plastic market by 2020, and (b) increasing ethylene output from 7 to 14 
million tones by 2010.156 Saudi Arabia is attempting to become one of the top three 
countries in this sector and has on numerous occasions courted Chinese support to 
develop their petrochemical industry.157 Al Dabbagh was confident that Saudi Arabia 
would reach its goals to the point that he stated “China should invest in Saudi Arabia’s 
petrochemical sector or risk becoming a victim of the Gulf nation’s aggressive bid to use 
its energy reserves to become an industry leader.”158  
In the Saudi kingdom’s eyes, China is an extremely attractive partner to solicit 
petrochemical investments from because it is an export-oriented country, and much of 
their exported goods use petrochemicals (i.e., plastics, fertilizers, detergents, resins). The 
greater the amount of Saudi petrochemicals the Chinese use to produce its export 
products, the greater the Saudi profits; therefore, as Chinese global exports grow so will 
Saudi profits. In Al Dabbagh’s words, Saudi Arabia needs an investor “who could also 
push the product, and they (the Chinese) have markets that can take these products. they 
have the distribution channels.”159 For the Chinese, it does make economic sense to 
invest in the Saudi petrochemical industry. It would be cheaper for Chinese companies to 
process petrochemicals in Saudi Arabia and then shipping it to China rather than shipping 
the raw materials and resources to China and then processing petrochemicals there.160 
Saudi Arabia is looking for foreign investments in excess of $50 billion over the 
next 15-20 years for their petrochemical industry. While there has been limited Sino-
Saudi cooperation in the petrochemical field, China has yet to substantially invest in 
Saudi’s petrochemical industry despite Saudi Arabia’s aggressive efforts to solicit 
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Chinese investments. Interestingly, Saudi companies have instead invested in Chinese 
petrochemical factories to gain a foothold in the Chinese economy.  On November 10, 
2006, Saudi Basic Industries Group (SABIC) stated that it intends to form a joint venture 
in China to build petrochemical facilities in China.161 However, if the demand for 
Chinese goods and petrochemicals increases and the Chinese do determine that it would 
be more cost-efficient to produce petrochemicals in Saudi Arabia, great potential exists 
for Chinese investments in Saudi Arabia’s petrochemical industry in the future. 
The Sino-Saudi relationship in this realm is mutually beneficial. While Chinese 
companies have an opportunity to profit from investing in various industrial projects, 
Saudi Arabia would also be benefiting from whatever Sino-Saudi economic arrangements 
it enters by receiving: (a) Chinese investments and technology for its industries, and/or 
(b) Chinese assistance in developing the necessary infrastructure that Saudi industries 
rely on to further grow and become competitive. The amount of Chinese investments into 
Saudi Arabia is projected to increase in the future as China and Saudi Arabia are studying 
a plan to establish a fund to promote investment between the two countries.162 It is 
important to note that despite the fact there is great potential in this realm of the Sino-
Saudi relationship, other than the $4 billion investment China made in Saudi Arabia’s 
alumina or aluminum oxide refineries, there has not been much Sino-Saudi interaction as 
of yet. While each side is taking the first steps for the Sino-Saudi relationship to grow in 
this area there have not been any substantial investments. 
3. Technology Transfer 
Since 2004, China and Saudi Arabia have signed numerous agreements designed 
to be mutually beneficial. A highpoint in Sino-Saudi relations was reached in April 2006 
when King Abdullah made his first visit to China since Sino-Saudi relations were 
established. During this visit, China and Saudi Arabia signed a set of five agreements 
expanding Sino-Saudi cooperation. These agreements encompassed oil, natural gas, 
minerals, trade, and technical matters.163  
                                                 
161 Graham-Harrison, "SABIC Says Plans China Petrochem Venture." 
162 Ibid. 
163 Harsh V. Pant, "Saudi Arabia Woos China and India," The Middle East Quarterly 13, no. 4 (Fall, 
2006), 1, http://www.meforum.org/article/1019 (accessed November 18, 2006). 
64 
Saudi Arabia realizes that the key component to future economic prosperity is for 
its industries to be able to produce goods which are not only competitive in the domestic 
market but also competitive in the international market. To this extent, Vision 2020 states 
that “Research shows that participation in internationally competitive markets is the best 
way of building economically significant human capital because it leads to faster 
technological learning and innovation through cluster networks. Hence the establishment 
of international linkages through links with foreign firms and international R&D centers 
is essential for faster domestic innovation and technological learning.”164 The technical 
and trade cooperation agreements that China and Saudi Arabia signed in 2006, while the 
exact details have not been released, has positioned China to play a vital role in not only 
providing the necessary financial support for Saudi industries, but also in providing Saudi 
workers with new skills based on technology and knowledge transfer. 
While Saudi Arabia realizes the importance of technology transfer, there has been 
little Sino-Saudi interaction here. There is not much data available regarding this topic 
suggesting that there has not been much Sino-Saudi interaction in this realm as of yet. As 
stated earlier, while China and Saudi Arabia seem to be taking the first steps to increase 
the Sino-Saudi technology transfer by signing cooperation agreements in April 2006, a 
strong Sino-Saudi relationship in this realm is yet to be seen. Neither side is aggressively 
pushing the other for more cooperation in this area.  
4. Summary 
In summary, Chinese economic policies are not directed at increasing its power 
and influence in Saudi Arabia at the cost of the United States as offensive realists may 
contend. China is taking a cautious approach as to the extent of the Sino-Saudi 
relationship which does not fit in well with the offensive realism school of thought. China 
is looking at Saudi Arabia as a long term energy source and as an opportunity to further 
expand economically - not as a state that it wishes to wrestle away from U.S. power and 
influence. Because China is not using its economic power to further an international 
political agenda to decrease U.S. power and influence, China’s economic actions closely 
aligns with the economic interdependence model. This is illustrated by three 
developments. 
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First, China is not providing Saudi Arabia with massive economic benefits to 
develop a closer Sino-Saudi relationship as the United States and Soviet Union did to its 
proxy states during the Cold War. China’s economic policies are geared primarily 
towards addressing its energy security and possibly taking advantage of economic 
opportunities within Saudi Arabia. China is not looking to reduce U.S. power and 
influence in Saudi Arabia through its Sino-Saudi economic ties, and in fact, is taking a 
cautious approach to the Sino-Saudi relationship. This is indicated by the lack of: (a) 
Chinese investments in Saudi Arabia, and (b) Sino-Saudi cooperation in technology 
sharing, both of which may further expand Sino-Saudi relationship at the cost of the U.S.-
Saudi relationship. 
Secondly, China has shown a reluctance to become too heavily invested in Saudi 
Arabia. While Saudi Arabia provides China with energy and vast economic opportunities, 
it has not taken full advantage of those economic opportunities to the extent it has with 
Iran. This may be for two reasons: (a) Saudi Arabia may not need Chinese capital as 
much as Iran does due to its massive oil revenues and its strong ties to the United States, 
and (b) China does not see any urgency in assisting Saudi Arabia since it does not face an 
international threat as Iran does. Interestingly, Saudi Arabia is the side aggressively 
courting Chinese investments (particularly in the petrochemical industry) and China is 
the side restraining its investments. This does not fit well in the offensive realists’ model 
because the Saudis courting Chinese investments in the petrochemical industry can be 
viewed as an opportunity for China to gain more power and influence in Saudi Arabia. 
Instead, China has so far refused to take advantage of this opportunity. The lack of Sino-
Saudi activity in this realm indicates that China is selective about what investments it 
wants to make in Saudi Arabia. This behavior fits more consistently with the economic 
interdependence model. China is not arbitrarily investing in Saudi Arabia in order to 
further the Sino-Saudi relationship at the cost of the U.S.-Saudi relationship. China 
invests in Saudi Arabia only if it feels that the investment is in its economic interests. 
Thirdly, China is also wary about becoming too reliant on Saudi oil and has 
attempted to diversify its oil suppliers globally. In 2006, China decided to make Angola 
its number one oil supplier. This behavior also does not fit well in the offensive realism 
model. If China was indeed acting in the offensive realism model, it should be 
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aggressively pursuing closer economic ties with Saudi Arabia. Increasing its Saudi 
economic ties by importing more Saudi oil may be viewed as one way China could 
expand its power and influence in Saudi Arabia at the cost of the hegemon. China has not 
done so and is instead taking a more cautious approach.  
C. MILITARY 
Due to Saudi Arabia’s relations with the United States, Sino-Saudi military 
relations have been very limited. Dating back to the Cold War, the United States has 
viewed the security of Saudi Arabia as part of its national interests. The United States 
followed through with its promise to protect the Saudi kingdom in 1989. When Iraq 
invaded Kuwait, the United States sent its military to the Persian Gulf to protect the Saudi 
kingdom and also to force Saddam Hussein to retreat from Kuwait. On the other hand, 
China does not have the same capability to project power globally as the United States 
does and therefore cannot provide the same security assurances against the international 
threats Saudi Arabia faces, particularly against Shi’a Iran. Even if the Chinese had the 
capability to project power globally, the Saudis may question the reliability of China’s 
security assurances due to the long relations China has with Iran. Additionally, the Saudis 
view China as a poor substitute for U.S. support against the other threats the Saudi 
kingdom faces on the domestic front from Islamic insurgents.165 
In addition to the security assurances provided by the United States, Saudi Arabia 
also purchases a substantial amount of arms from the United States further expanding 
U.S.-Saudi military relations. Between 1997 and 2004, Saudi Arabia ordered $7.3 billion 
worth of U.S. arms while the United States delivered $22.9 billion worth of military 
equipment over the same time period.166 This realm of U.S.-Saudi relations is expanding. 
In July 2006, President Bush notified Congress that he had approved a number of arms 
deals to Saudi Arabia that may be worth in excess of $9 billion.167 Saudi Arabia sought 
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these deals to supplement the Saudi Arabian National Guard in light of the increased 
regional tensions and counterterrorism requirements.168 These deals included advanced 
military equipment such as Blackhawk helicopters and various light armored vehicles.  
Due to the security assurances provided to Saudi Arabia by the United States and 
also due to the substantial sale of U.S. military equipment to Saudi Arabia, there has been 
little reason for Sino-Saudi military relations to expand. The unfavorable experience 
Saudi Arabia had with China in the CSS-2 missile system deal may also play a role in 
explaining the minimal Sino-Saudi military relations. During the late 1980s, Saudi Arabia 
reached an agreement with China to purchase 36 CSS-2 Intermediate Range Ballistic 
Missiles (IRBMs). China intended the CSS-2 IRBM system to be its main regional 
nuclear weapon system. It was designed to target U.S. bases in Japan, South Korea and 
the Philippines.169 With a range of 3000 km, Saudi Arabia is able to target any country in 
the Middle East region as well as parts of India. The downside to the CSS-2 missile 
system is twofold: (a) it is an extremely cumbersome system, and (b) the accuracy of the 
CSS-2 is less than desirable. First, the CSS-2 system requires dozens of vehicles and 
hundreds of personnel to launch its missiles. Additionally, the fuel that the CSS-2 missile 
uses is highly corrosive and can be fatal if inhaled. Should Saudi Arabia decide to use the 
missile system, it would most likely need assistance from Chinese personnel due to the 
complexity of the system. Saudi Arabia also needs Chinese personnel to maintain the 
missile system, which is stored in two facilities south of Riyadh.170 Secondly, because 
the missiles were designed to carry a nuclear warhead the accuracy of the missile leaves 
much to be desired. As a result, the effectiveness of the missile when it carries a 
conventional warhead is extremely limited. Many experts believe that without a nuclear 
warhead the missile system is basically useless and the Saudis were misled when 
purchasing this antiquated missile system. This experience may have made the Saudis 
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more cautious about purchasing arms from China, particularly when the United States is 
also willing to sell arms to Saudi Arabia.171 
In the future, there is potential for the Sino-Saudi military relationship to expand. 
Although the details of the agreement have not been released, China and Saudi Arabia 
signed an agreement to promote Sino-Saudi security cooperation in April 2006. 
Additionally, while the Saudis may have had an unfavorable experience with China over 
the CSS-2 missiles deal, Saudi Arabia is keenly aware of the amount of military 
equipment China is exporting to Iran. Some experts have acknowledged the possibility of 
Saudi Arabia purchasing arms from China in order to curtail Chinese arms exports to 
Iran, if not lure China away from Iran.172 A former assistant director in the Saudi General 
Intelligence Directorate stated, “Clearly, we (Saudis) are going to have to give the 
Chinese numerous incentives for them to stop supplying the Iranians with those long-
range missiles. One way is clearly going to have to be a redirection of Saudi purchases to 
also include Chinese military equipment. The usual suppliers (U.S., England, and France) 
won’t lose importance, of course.”173 
In summary, as a result of the Saudi-U.S. relations, China and Saudi Arabia have 
not had close military relations. There are two primary reasons for this: (a) the United 
States has provided Saudi Arabia with advanced military equipment to strengthen the 
Saudi military and National Guard against domestic threats such as the Islamic 
insurgents, and (b) the United States has provided security assurances to Saudi Arabia 
that China cannot provide. The Chinese military does not have the capability to project 
military power globally as the United States does and is not expected to achieve that 
capability any time in the near future.174.  
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While China may be limited in the military assistance it can provide to Saudi 
Arabia, if China was acting in the offensive realism mold it should still be attempting to 
undermine the U.S.-Saudi military ties in order to further the Sino-Saudi military ties. 
This has not been the case. Instead, there was only one instance where China sold limited 
military equipment to Saudi Arabia during the 1980s and there have not been any 
significant Sino-Saudi arms deals since then. This lack of activity in the Sino-Saudi 
military relationship may be explained by the fact that since the stability and preservation 
of current Saudi royal family is in both Chinese and U.S. interests, China is content with 
the strong U.S.-Saudi military relationship. To put more directly, the Chinese may view 
the situation as the United States being obligated to protect Chinese interests (Saudi oil) 
without China having to take an economic hit. China’s behavior in this light would 
definitely be in line with the economic interdependence model. China is content with the 
status quo because it benefits or preserves Chinese economic interests and therefore will 
not take any actions which may change it. While the Sino-Saudi military relations has the 
potential to expand in the future (partially as a result of the growing Iranian threat and the 
Sino-Saudi security agreement signed in April 2006), China and Saudi Arabia have yet to 
take the first step.  
D. POLITICAL 
The United States has traditionally had strong political relations with Saudi 
Arabia. While each side has had their differences in opinion, the common objectives of 
defeating communism, containing Iran, and the extensive Sino-U.S. economic ties have 
kept the two countries allied. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the U.S.-Saudi 
relationship lost a vital pillar on which it was based on thereby putting a strain on the 
relationship. The post 9/11 era has brought on additional strains on the U.S.-Saudi 
relationship. As stated earlier, the tragedy of 9/11 and the unpopularity of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom have all posed challenges to the U.S.-Saudi relationship which has provided 
China with an opportunity to expand Sino-Saudi relations at the cost of the U.S.-Saudi 
relations.  
1. Diplomatic Ties 
The Sino-Saudi relationship, being established in 1990, is relatively new when 
compared to the U.S.-Saudi relationship. Ever since relations were established, there have 
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been a steady flow of diplomatic visits conducted by both sides. Between 1990 and 2002, 
Saudi Arabia officials have made 22 diplomatic visits to China while Chinese officials 
have made 21 diplomatic visits to Saudi Arabia during the same timeframe.175 
The Sino-Saudi relationship further expanded during Chinese President Jiang 
Zemin’s state visit to Saudi Arabia in 1999. During this meeting, China and Saudi Arabia 
signed an agreement which “inaugurated a strategic oil partnership.” 2006 brought about 
a renewed effort to develop closer Sino-Saudi relations. The visits between President Hu 
Jintao and Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz in 2006 and the impressive array of new 
agreements between the Saudi and Chinese governments indicate such a trend. During 
King Abdullah’s visit to China in January 2006, China and Saudi Arabia signed 
numerous agreements for cooperation in energy (petroleum, mineral, and natural gas), 
trade, and professional training/technical matters.176 This visit carried special 
significance due to two reasons: (a) it was King Abdullah’s first visit outside the Middle 
East since he took the throne in 2005, and (b) it was the first time a Saudi king had made 
a state visit to China.177 A short three months later, President Hu Jintao made a 
diplomatic visit to Saudi Arabia further highlighting the seriousness of Sino-Saudi 
relations. Having consecutive head-of-state exchanges in such a short time is considered 
unusual. Additionally, President Hu was only the second foreign president to address the 
Saudi Consultative Council in history (after Jacques Chirac).178 During this visit, the 
Sino-Saudi relationship expanded further with the signing of agreements to cooperate in 
energy exploration, security, and health care.179 
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2. Chinese Perspective 
China’s efforts to develop closer political relations with Saudi Arabia are based 
on four goals. The two most important goals are driven by the Chinese desire to secure its 
own energy security.180 First, China is attempting to ensure it has access to Saudi energy 
sources in the future in order to meet its energy demands. Secondly, China is also 
attempting to maintain its diversity in energy sources. As discussed earlier, China’s 
economic growth is heavily dependent on its ability to meet energy demands; however, 
China also realizes the security implications of becoming heavily reliant on a single 
source of energy. While China may be limiting the amount of Saudi oil it imports, Saudi 
Arabia still plays a vital role in maintaining the diversity in Chinese oil supplies (i.e. 
keeping China from becoming too reliant on Angola and Iran). Thirdly, China is seeking 
to not only improve its energy security but also to expand its trade markets. As stated 
earlier, Saudi Arabia has emerged as a major Middle Eastern trading partner for China 
and it is looking to further expand this relationship. There have been numerous meetings 
and conferences between Saudi Arabia and China in order to promote more trade and 
economic cooperation. Lastly, China is looking to protect its economic interests in the 
Middle East by curtailing U.S. unilateral actions. China feels uncomfortable with the 
current Middle East environment for two main reasons: (a) the preponderance of U.S. 
military forces in the region, and (b) the U.S. willingness to take unilateral action. These 
two reasons are inter-related for obvious reasons. The preponderance of U.S. military 
forces allows the United States to take unilateral action in the region. There is no denying 
that China is seeking to curtail U.S. power and influence in order to preserve the status 
quo in the Middle East which provides China with a steady flow of energy.181 Because 
the United States views Saudi Arabia as a vital economic and political partner, Saudi 
Arabia does carry some weight in influencing U.S. policies. By expanding its political 
and economic relations with Saudi Arabia and increasing the common interests they 
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share, China may be seeking to influence U.S. behavior (and perhaps diminish U.S. 
influence) through the Sino-Saudi relationship. 
3. Arab Perspective 
From the Arab perspective, China provides a breath of fresh air. In addition to the 
obvious economic incentives for closer Sino-Saudi relations, there are numerous other 
reasons why Saudi Arabia is pursuing closer relations with China. While many Middle 
Eastern governments, including Saudi Arabia, rely on the United States for their security, 
they also find it challenging to maintain their close relations with the United States for 
numerous reasons. The rise of China in the global picture allows Middle Eastern 
countries a counterweight, if not an alternative, to turn to other than the United States.182 
Saudi Arabia’s close relations with the United States have been a troubling issue 
for the Saudi royal family. Because of the United States’ role in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
Israeli-Palestinian issue, and the conflict in Lebanon, the Saudi kingdom has faced both 
domestic and international criticism for placing its unwillingness to damage Saudi-U.S. 
relations over Islamic solidarity.183 Developing closer political and economic relations 
with China will allow Saudi Arabia to distance itself from the United States, allowing the 
Saudi royal family to avoid at least some of the criticism for close Saudi-U.S. relations.  
Closer Sino-Saudi ties will not only provide diversification to Saudi economic ties 
but also to its political ties which may have repercussion on the U.S.-Saudi relations in 
the future. Close U.S.-Saudi political ties have produced favorable Saudi oil policies for 
the United States. For instance, shortly after Hurricane Katrina, Saudi Arabia led the 
drive to convince OPEC members to lower oil prices and increase oil production in order 
to overcome the loss of oil production from the United States. The Saudi kingdom also 
widened the discounts on the oil it provided to the United States and other European 
countries. This Saudi stance was a complete turnaround from its previous stance shortly 
before Hurricane Katrina.184 If the Sino-Saudi political and economic relations continue 
                                                 
182 Fandy. Energy Security: Implications for U.S.-China-Middle East Relations - China Vs U.S.: A 
View from the Arab Perspective, 4. 
183 Douglas, Nelson and Schwartz, Fueling the Dragon's Flame: How China's Energy Demands 
Affects its Relationships in the Middle East, 19. 
184 Javier Blas, "Saudi Arabia Urges OPEC to Cover Shortfall in Crude," Financial Times, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/6cc09352-1f06-11da-94d5-00000e2511c8.html (accessed February 28, 2007). 
73 
to expand and should the Saudis value that relationship more, it may result in a loss of 
U.S. power and influence in Saudi Arabia which may mean that the Saudi willingness to 
accommodate U.S. requests regarding oil policies may be diminished. While the United 
States still imports over 1.41 million of barrels/day, the Chinese are steadily catching up 
in terms importing Saudi oil. In 1995, Saudi Arabia was China’s 25th largest exporter of 
oil but in 2007 it will be one of the top five oil suppliers to China.185 Saudi Arabia has 
already shown its willingness to accommodate the Chinese interests at the cost of the 
United States. In 2004, Saudi Arabia cut its oil exports to the United States substantially 
and instead exported that oil to China.186 Expanded Sino-Saudi political ties may lead to 
greater Chinese influence over Saudi oil policies at the cost of U.S. power and influence.  
The Saudi royal family also looks at closer Sino-Saudi relations in a favorable 
light because of China’s policy of “non-interference” in a country’s internal matters - 
particularly in terms of its “social system” and “road of development.”187 Unlike the 
United States, China does not attempt to pressure other governments to adopt democracy, 
human rights, and other issues. The Saudis view the Sino-Saudi relationship as “no 
strings attached.” Because China does not push democracy or reform, the Saudis feel 
there are no hidden agendas with the Sino-Saudi relationship and find this aspect of the 
relationship very appealing when compared to the U.S.-Saudi relationship.188 As Prince 
Turki al-Faisal stated in an interview, the Saudis view China as “not necessarily a better 
friend, but a less complicated friend.”189 
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There are numerous other factors that are pushing Saudi Arabia to develop closer 
relations with China. First, Muslims do not have a negative perception of China.190 Due 
to the fact China is not associated with hegemony, imperialism and domination as the 
United States and European nations are, Muslims do not view China as a political 
threat.191 Because of the absence of an anti-Chinese sentiment among the Muslim 
population in the Middle East, Middle Eastern governments find it easier to develop 
closer relations with the Chinese over deepening their ties with the United States.192 
Secondly, Muslims have a certain degree of admiration for China. They are impressed 
with China’s explosive economic growth believing that it has occurred without China 
sacrificing social justice, law and order, or traditional values.193  
Despite the incentives for closer Sino-Saudi relationship, Saudi Arabia does view 
China with a certain degree of skepticism. The main reason for this skepticism is China’s 
long and close relations with Iran. President Hu Jintao attempted to address this Saudi 
concern during his visit to Saudi Arabia in April 2006. President Hu stated that “different 
civilizations of the region should take a peaceful and magnanimous attitude toward each 
other’s differences,” and that “differences should not become the root cause to regional 
conflicts and contradictions, but should become each other’s reference and a force for 
integration of the region.”194 President Hu seems to be indicating that China does not 
consider the Sino-Saudi relationship subservient to the Sino-Iranian relationship.195  
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Even though the Saudis view China with some skepticism, some experts believe 
that China has already begun balancing of the Sino-Saudi relationship and Sino-Iranian 
relationship in certain issues. Saudi strategic considerations along with U.S. pressure may 
have influenced China’s actions against Iran over its nuclear program.196 As stated 
earlier, Saudi Arabia is not only one of China’s main energy suppliers but it also may 
play a vital role in filling China’s strategic oil reserves. Saudi Arabia, as opposed to Iran, 
has the capability to act as a “swing producer” to produce oil far beyond its OPEC 
quota.197 China has already provided Saudi Arabia with privileges other countries do not 
have in terms of collaboration over the creation of the Chinese strategic oil reserves. In 
addition to U.S. pressure and the unwillingness to see an armed conflict in the Middle 
East which would harm Chinese economic interest (i.e. oil flow and Chinese interests in 
Iran), China’s decision to vote against Iran on the UNSC may have also been influenced 
by the desire to see favorable treatment from Saudi Arabia in matters concerning trade 
and energy (i.e. the filling of the Chinese strategic oil reserve).198  
4. Summary 
In summary, the Chinese and Saudi Arabian motivation to develop closer political 
relations is motivated for numerous reasons. First, both China and Saudi Arabia feel that 
closer Sino-Saudi political relations will lead to great economic benefits. China hopes 
that closer political relations will lead to greater energy access and larger trade markets. 
Saudi Arabia is hoping that closer political relations will lead to greater Chinese 
investments and assistance in economic development. Secondly, Saudi Arabia sees a 
need to diversify its political relations as a result of the rise in criticism of U.S.-Saudi 
relations. Thirdly, Saudi Arabia is hoping that closer Sino-Saudi relations will affect the 
Sino-Iranian relationship. As stated earlier, the Saudis would like to see decreased Sino-
Iranian military relations. Finally, China is disturbed by the current Middle East 
environment. China, seeing the preponderance of U.S. military forces in the Middle East 
and the U.S.’s willingness to take unilateral actions, is seeking greater influence over the 
future direction of Middle Eastern affairs. Due to the close relations Saudi Arabia has 
                                                 




with the United States, China hopes to limit the United States’ ability to act  
unilaterally through closer Sino-Saudi ties.  
While offensive realists may view these actions as China attempting to expand 
their power and influence in the Middle East at the cost of the United States, China’s 
actions do not fit well in their theory. First, China’s political policies are geared towards 
increasing China’s energy security and economic interests. China is not only looking to 
develop closer Sino-Saudi ties so Saudi Arabia remains a vital long term energy source, 
but also to keep Chinese energy sources diversified. Secondly, China is also looking to 
expand its trade market in Saudi Arabia. These two main Chinese objectives are 
economic in nature, which aligns Chinese actions closer to the economic interdependence 
model rather than the offensive realism model.  
There is no denying that China is looking to curtail U.S. unilateral action in the 
Middle East region; however, even this intension fits within the economic 
interdependence model. China is seeking greater influence in the Middle East not because 
it is seeking to expand its power, but because it desires to protect its economic interests 
from U.S. unilateral action, which include the survival of the Iranian regime and avoiding 
any scenario which may disrupt the flow of energy to China. This indicates that China is 
mainly seeking to avoid armed conflict in order to preserve its economic interests; 
therefore, China’s actions fit more closely along the lines of the economic 
interdependence model. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This case study has attempted to decipher Chinese intensions toward Saudi 
Arabia. The main question it attempted to address was whether Chinese actions were in 
accordance with the offensive realism model or economic interdependence model. As 
stated earlier in the chapter, if China is acting in the offensive realism mold, it should be 
attempting to expand its power and influence in Saudi Arabia at every opportunity with 
the intent to undermine U.S. hegemony. This would include proactive actions to: (a) 
provide Saudi Arabia with massive economic assistance and incentives to develop closer 
Sino-Saudi economic and political ties with the intent to reduce U.S. power and 
influence, (b) selling Saudi Arabia sophisticated arms and providing security assurances 
to make Saudi Arabia less dependent on the United States and more so on China, and (c) 
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encouraging Saudi Arabia to shift their political allegiance from the Untied States over to 
China. If China is acting in the economic interdependence mold, it should be: (a) 
interacting economically with Saudi Arabia in a manner which makes economic sense 
(i.e. profitable), (b) interacting militarily with Saudi Arabia in a business manner, and not 
providing it with massive amounts of advanced military hardware with the sole purpose 
to make it less reliant on the U.S. security assurance and arms sales, and (c) developing a 
Sino-Saudi political relationship based on furthering their economic interests and not 
based on degrading the U.S.-Saudi political relationship. This case study has shown that 
Chinese intensions are more along the lines of the economic interdependence school of 
thought rather than the offensive realism school of thought.  
In the economic realm, China views Saudi Arabia not only as a long term energy 
source but also as an opportunity to further expand economically - not as a state that it 
wishes to wrestle away from U.S. power and influence. With respect to the Sino-Saudi 
economic relationship, China is primarily concerned with four things: (a) securing Saudi 
Arabian energy sources in order to continue its economic growth over the long term, (b) 
maintain Saudi Arabia’s continued role in providing diversification in Chinese energy 
sources, (c) expanding its trade market in Saudi Arabia, and (d) taking advantage of 
various investment opportunities in Saudi Arabia. These four goals are all economic in 
nature and are not intended to undermine U.S. hegemony in the region. If China was 
acting in the offensive realism mold, it should be taking advantage of every opportunity 
to use its economic resources, even if its policies do not make economic sense, towards a 
political agenda of developing closer Sino-Saudi ties in a manner which decreases U.S. 
power and influence in Saudi Arabia.  
On the contrary, Chinese economic policies toward Saudi Arabia make economic 
sense and are not political in nature with respect to the international balance of power. 
China has not arbitrarily invested in Saudi Arabia with the sole purpose to develop closer 
Sino-Saudi ties. It has also shown an unwillingness to become overly reliant on Saudi oil. 
It is also interesting that China has not invested heavily in Saudi Arabia despite Saudi 
Arabia’s public desire for more Chinese investments. These actions are not consistent 
with a state that is aggressively pursuing to expand their power and influence in a region 
at the cost of the hegemon.  
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In the military realm, China and Saudi Arabia have not had close relations. There 
are two primary reasons for this: (a) the United States has provided Saudi Arabia with 
advanced military equipment to strengthen the Saudi military and National Guard against 
domestic threats such as the Islamic insurgents, and (b) the United States has provided 
security assurances to Saudi Arabia against international threats that China cannot 
provide.  
While China may be limited in the military assistance it can provide to Saudi 
Arabia, if it was acting in the offensive realism mold it should still be attempting to 
undermine the U.S.-Saudi military ties in order to further the Sino-Saudi military ties. 
While the Sino-Saudi military relations has the potential to expand in the future (partially 
as a result of the growing Iranian threat and the Sino-Saudi security agreement signed in 
April 2006), China and Saudi Arabia have yet to take the first step. The lack of activity in 
the Sino-Saudi military relationship may be due to the fact that China is content with the 
situation because U.S. and Chinese interests closely align. From China’s perspective, if 
the United States is obliged to protect Chinese economic interests (Saudi oil) at no cost to 
the Chinese government, it is in China’s interest to maintain that environment. China’s 
behavior in this light would definitely be in line with the economic interdependence 
model.  
China’s objectives in the political realm of the Sino-Saudi relationship are also 
closely aligned with the economic interdependence school of thought for numerous 
reasons. First, China’s political policies are geared towards increasing its energy security. 
China is looking to develop closer Sino-Saudi ties so Saudi Arabia remains a vital long 
term energy source and to keep Chinese energy sources diversified. Secondly, China is 
also looking to expand its trade market in Saudi Arabia. These two main Chinese 
objectives are economic in nature which aligns Chinese actions closer to the economic 
interdependence model rather than the offensive realism model. If China was seeking to 
decrease U.S. hegemony in the Middle East, its objectives in the Sino-Saudi political 
relationship should not be mainly economic in nature and should be geared towards 
weakening the U.S.-Saudi political relationship. If China was acting in the offensive 
realism mold, it should be actively pressuring Saudi Arabia to weaken its political ties to 
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the United States; thereby increasing the amount of Chinese influence in Saudi Arabia. 
There has been no indication that China has been taking such actions. 
While there is no denying that China is looking to curtail U.S. unilateral action in 
the Middle East region through a stronger Sino-Saudi political relationship, even this 
intension fits within the economic interdependence model. China is seeking greater 
influence in the Middle East not because it wants to expand its powers at the cost of the 
United States, but because it is seeking to prevent the United States from taking unilateral 
actions which may damage Chinese economic interests. Any conflict in the Middle East 
will likely result in increased energy prices and may possibly cause an energy disruption; 
therefore, China is seeking to avoid that scenario. Additionally, because the most likely 
conflict in the Middle East would involve the United States and Iran (which the Chinese 
have vast economic interests as highlighted in the previous chapter), China may be 
seeking to influence U.S. behavior through the Sino-Saudi relationship in an attempt to 
avoid any conflict that would involve Iran. This indicates that China is mainly concerned 
about economic matters and not on balance of power issues; therefore, China’s actions fit 
more closely along the lines of the economic interdependence model. 
In summary, great potential exists for Sino-Saudi relations to expand substantially 
in the future. While each side acknowledges the great potential of this relationship, both 
sides seem to have barely begun to take the steps to develop a strong Sino-Saudi 
relationship. This case study has shown that both Sino and Saudi economic interests are 
the driving force behind the expansion of the Sino-Saudi relationship – and not China’s 
desire to expand its power and influence in the Middle East at the cost of the hegemon. 
The Sino-Saudi relationship is destined to expand in the future, but it will follow more 
closely along the lines of the economic interdependence school of thought rather than the 































A. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS 
The Sino-Saudi and Sino-Iranian case studies have illustrated both similarities and 
differences in the way China approaches Iran and Saudi Arabia. China has approached 
Iran and Saudi Arabia in different manners. With respect to Iran, China is: (a) providing 
massive economic assistance to Iran, (b) interacting extensively with Iran on the political 
realm, and (c) providing China with limited military arms sales. As opposed to the Sino-
Iranian relationship, the Sino-Saudi relationship is much more limited in scope. 
Pertaining to Saudi Arabia, China has: (a) not extensively interacted economically with 
Saudi Arabia outside of the energy realm, (b) had limited political relations with Saudi 
Arabia until 2006, and (c) had virtually no military relations with Saudi Arabia since 
1990. The differences between Sino-Saudi and Sino-Iranian relations are mainly a result 
of external factors. While Iran faces a harsh international environment where the United 
States and other Western powers are attempting to isolate it, Saudi Arabia is supported by 
the United States. For this reason, the relationship China has with Iran is far more 
extensive than the Sino-Saudi relationship.  
Despite the differing approaches China has taken to develop the Sino-Iranian and 
Sino-Saudi relationships, China’s overall objectives in developing these two relationships 
are the same. By developing closer relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran, China is seeking 
to: (a) further enhance Chinese energy security which its continued economic growth is 
dependent on, and (b) further expand its mutually beneficial economic relations (i.e. trade 
expansion and other economic opportunities).   
In the case of Iran, because China views Iran as a long term energy source and as 
an opportunity to expand economically, it is taking steps to ensure the survival of the 
Iranian regime. This case study has shown that while China is providing political, 
military, and economic support to Iran in order to sustain the regime, it is also 
cooperating with the United States in order to prevent U.S. unilateral actions which may 
result in the toppling of the Iranian regime. This is indicated by China’s willingness to 
take actions contrary to Iranian interests which include: (a) referring Iran to the UNSC, 
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(b) cooperating with the United States in the UNSC to include imposing sanctions on 
Iran, and (c) publicly and privately warning Iran that China is against the possibility of 
Iran possessing nuclear weapons. By taking actions to avoid an armed conflict between 
the United States and Iran, China is seeking to strengthen its energy security in the long 
term. 
Economically, China has made it clear that any economic arrangement it enters in 
with Iran must be “on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.” This case study has 
shown that the economic assistance China has provided to Iran makes economic sense on 
both sides and it is not arbitrarily providing Iran with economic support for political 
purposes (i.e. strengthening Iran to challenge the United States). China expects this 
economic relationship to serve its own economic interests as much as it serves Iran’s.  
Militarily, the Sino-Iranian case study has shown that China has not provided Iran 
with massive amounts of sophisticated and advanced military arms. This indicates that 
China is not looking for Iran to provoke and challenge the United States militarily. 
Additionally, China has cooperated with the United States regarding limiting its arms 
sales and preventing the transfer of military technology to Iran. This shows China’s 
desire to maintain the status quo and avoid any scenario which may pose a threat to 
Chinese energy security. 
When looking at Saudi Arabia, one must realize Saudi Arabia has two vital 
characteristics Iran does not. First, Saudi Arabia is awash in cash due to being the number 
one oil producer in the world in an era where energy prices have hit an all-time high. 
Secondly, Saudi Arabia has strong military relations with a world superpower.  
Economically, there is little Sino-Saudi interaction outside of the energy realm. 
While China does import massive amounts of oil from Saudi Arabia, it has not invested a 
great amount in Saudi Arabia. While there is great potential for the Sino-Saudi 
relationship to expand in this area (particularly after they signed a number of cooperation 
agreements to better foster trade, investment, and technical matters), both countries are 
taking their time developing these relations. Instead, China is content with focusing on 
Sino-Saudi energy matters and improving Chinese energy security. 
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Militarily, China has not had strong relations with Saudi Arabia. This is most 
likely due to the fact Saudi Arabia has strong military relations with the United States. 
Additionally, since China views Saudi Arabia as a long term energy source, its interests 
fall in line with U.S. interests regarding Saudi Arabia. Both the United States and China 
view Saudi Arabia as a vital energy source and both want the preservation of the Saudi 
royal family and stability and security within Saudi Arabia. In this case, China is content 
with the current U.S.-Saudi military relationship. If the United States is obliged to protect 
Saudi Arabia, and thereby a vital Chinese energy source, China realizes that the situation 
is beneficial because Saudi Arabia’s security is ensured without it having to use any of its 
economic resources.  
Politically, China has geared its policies in Saudi Arabia towards addressing its 
energy security. China’s policies have grown politically closer to Saudi Arabia in order 
to: (a) ensure access to future energy supplies, and (b) to maintain Saudi Arabia’s role in 
keeping Chinese energy sources diversified. Additionally, China is possibly looking to 
Saudi Arabia to influence the United States in curtailing U.S. unilateral action. China 
views U.S. unilateral action (particularly towards Iran) as the greatest threat to Chinese 
economic interests in the Middle East and therefore is seeking to avoid that scenario. 
The two case studies have shown that China’s policies in the Middle East is not 
geared towards expanding its power and influence at every opportunity in order to 
challenge the hegemon as the offensive realism model would predict. Instead, China is 
seeking to maintain the status quo which is allowing the Chinese economy to grow at an 
astonishing rate and to protect its economic interests in the Middle East. These two goals 
are highly dependent on: (a) avoiding a disruption in energy flow from the Middle East as 
a result of an armed conflict, (b) maintaining good Sino-Saudi and Sino-U.S. relations 
while seeking the survival of the Iranian regime, and (c) maintaining its economic 
expansion in the Middle East. Because China’s actions are geared towards fulfilling those 
three economic goals which are not intended to undermine U.S. hegemony, its actions are 
closer to the economic interdependence model. 
B. POLICY OPTIONS ANALYSIS 
The case studies have shown the complexity of China’s expansion into the Middle 
East. The challenging environment the United States now faces in the Middle East is not 
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only the result of various geopolitical events (i.e., Operation Iraqi Freedom), but also due 
to China’s growing power and influence in the Middle East. There is no question that 
China’s connection to the Middle East will make it more challenging for the United 
States to successfully pursue its objectives and follow through with unilateral action.  
In this geopolitical environment where China is acting in the economic 
interdependence mold, there are numerous options that the United States can pursue 
regarding the Sino-U.S. relationship involving the Middle East: (a) view China as a rising 
competitor and work against Chinese interests in the Middle East in order to preserve 
U.S. hegemony, (b) maintain the status quo and pursue U.S. objectives in the Middle East 
while refusing to acknowledge or take into account Chinese interests, or (c) develop 
closer Sino-U.S. ties so that greater Sino-U.S. cooperation can occur in matters pertaining 
to the Middle East and energy security. 
The first option would be an attempt to preserve and expand U.S. power and 
influence in the Middle East which many Americans would likely desire. Additionally, if 
the United States is able to minimize Chinese power and influence in the Middle East, it 
may give the United States more freedom to pursue its objectives and increase the 
likelihood of success for U.S. policies in the Middle East. As much as the United States 
desires to maintain the power and influence it has in the Middle East, this option of 
considering China as a rising threat and taking actions to undermine it does not seem to 
be successfully attainable for numerous reasons.  
First, China is already heavily connected economically to numerous Middle 
Eastern countries and the United States will not be able to exclude China from the region. 
Even if the United States attempts to persuade its Middle Eastern allies to isolate China, 
the likelihood that they would abide by the U.S. request is very minimal. The Middle 
Eastern states have too much to gain from maintaining good Sino-Middle East relations 
and would likely push aside U.S. requests to minimize that relationship. Secondly, taking 
overt actions to limit Chinese influence in the Middle East will likely yield more anti-
American sentiments not only in the Middle East, but also with states throughout the 
world. In this globalized world, China has strong economic ties with countries throughout 
the world (including U.S. allies) and as a result there could be a global backlash against 
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the United States. Additionally, the population and governments in the Middle East 
would most likely view the United States behaving in an imperialistic manner which 
would degrade U.S. power and influence in the Middle East. Thirdly, China’s economy is 
closely connected to the United States economy as a result of the globalized economy.  
The U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson recently conceded that “the prosperity of the 
United States and China is tied together in the global economy, and how we work 
together on a host of bilateral and multilateral issues will have a significant impact on the 
health of the global economy.”199 Should China’s economy falter due to economic 
challenges (i.e. lack of energy sources), it will likely have a devastating effect on the U.S. 
economy. In this scenario, it would not be beneficial to the United States to actively 
undermine Chinese interests. Fourth, China will likely take retaliatory actions in all 
realms. Military hostilities will undoubtedly increase between the two countries and may 
even result in conflict. Additionally, with China possessing over one trillion dollars of 
U.S. currency, it has an economic weapon that could have devastating impacts on the 
U.S. economy. These factors do not make this option appealing, much less the most 
beneficial course of action to take regarding Sino-U.S. relations involving the Middle 
East. 
Much like the first option, the second option of maintaining the status quo and 
pursuing U.S. objectives regardless of Chinese interests is an attempt for the United 
States to maintain the freedom it has in pursuing its objectives in the Middle East. While 
the United States may be able to pursue its policies in the Middle East without 
cooperating with China, whether the pursuit of those policies will be successful is another 
matter. First, China has demonstrated over the last few years that it can successfully 
cause problems for the United States and its policies in international institutions. China is 
a veto wielding member of the UNSC and that role has frustrated U.S. efforts over the 
Iranian nuclear crisis. Secondly, if China feels that U.S. policies act against Chinese 
interests, it can undermine U.S. actions in numerous ways. The Sino-Iranian case study 
has shown that China will not hesitate to use its economic, political, and military means 
to further its objectives and undermine U.S. policies.                                                   
199 Michael A. Needham, Tim Kane and John J. Tkacik, "Preparing for the U.S.-China Strategic 
Economic Dialogue," The Heritage Foundation, 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm1276.cfm (accessed March 1, 2007). 
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The third option to develop closer relations with China to cooperate in Middle 
Eastern and energy security matters will likely yield the most benefits for both the United 
States and China. In the current environment where Middle Eastern countries now have 
two major powers vying for energy resources which allows them to balance one 
relationship off the other to further their interests, the United States is best served to 
approach the Middle East in a more multilateral way. As stated earlier, attempting to 
minimize or overlook Chinese influence in the Middle East will only pose more 
challenges to the United States in the pursuit of its objectives. China has shown that it can 
successfully act as an obstacle in the UNSC against the United States and has also shown 
that its political, economic, and military policies can undermine U.S. policies. In this 
environment, the United States should work more closely with China in Middle Eastern 
affairs in order to increase the likelihood that its policies will succeed.  
The case studies have shown that Chinese actions are more closely linked to the 
economic interdependence theory of international relations; therefore, it may be possible 
to increase Sino-U.S. cooperation as long as each side acknowledges and respects each 
other’s economic and national interests. China is not determined to undermine U.S. 
objectives in the Middle East as long as it does not feel its economic interests are 
threatened. The case studies have illustrated that China has shown the willingness to 
cooperate with the United States as long as a mutual dialogue exists and the United States 
makes the effort to convince the Chinese its policies are mutually beneficial. We have 
seen this in China’s stance on the Iranian nuclear crisis. While it is in China’s economic 
interest to see a strong Iranian regime that can provide it long term energy, China has 
gradually weakened its support for Iran culminating in its January 2006 U.N. vote to refer 
Iran to the UNSC and its December 2006 U.N. vote to impose sanctions against Iran. The 
change in the Chinese stance is because they realize that the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons is not beneficial for China and is also counterproductive towards Middle East 
stability and security. 
In the political realm, the United States should seek to establish a direct dialogue 
with China over its regional activities. While the transaction costs200 of this approach will 
                                                 
200 Transaction costs: Non-monetary costs incurred through a transaction (i.e., time and effort). 
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be higher due to the United States having to take the time and make the effort to ensure 
China understands the U.S. objectives and intensions, the likelihood of success for U.S. 
policies will increase dramatically if the United States can convince China to support it. 
When taking this approach, it is vital for the United States to convince China that U.S. 
policies are not seeking to hinder China’s development and economic rise.  
The United States must also convince China that each side must cooperate with 
the other in a mutually beneficial way in order to promote Middle Eastern regional 
stability and security, which is in the interests of both states. Only through dialogue, 
cooperation, and by drawing China into the discussion table regarding Middle Eastern 
affairs can the United States develop China’s trust and persuade it that some of its Middle 
Eastern regional activities (i.e., supporting Iran which provides arms and money to 
terrorist groups like Hezbollah which promote regional instability) is not in its own long 
term economic interests. Additionally, the United States should pursue closer cooperation 
with China in WMD and missile technology nonproliferation efforts. 
In the economic and energy security realm, the United States must cooperate 
more closely with China regarding China’s pursuit for energy security. More dialogue 
must take place to convince China that its pursuit of oil equity deals may not only be 
inefficient, but also harmful to global interests. China’s willingness to overpay for energy 
through these oil equity deals has served to distort global energy prices. In order to foster 
more Sino-U.S. dialogue on energy security and to coordinate international energy 
security policies with China’s policies, the United States should support China’s 
admission into the International Energy Agency (IEA). As long as China is not part of the 
IEA, Chinese energy security policies may continue to pose a challenge to the western 
nations’ efforts on energy security.201 The United States should also continue to engage 
China through multilateral organizations such as the Energy Working Group of the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and the Asia-Pacific Partnership for Clean 
Development and Climate.  
There is no question that it will be challenging, and perhaps may be impossible 
for dialogue alone to improve Sino-U.S. cooperation. Both sides view the other side with 
                                                 
201 Leverett and Bader, Managing China-U.S. Energy Competition in the Middle East , 198. 
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skepticism. In both Washington and Beijing, there are people who view the other side as 
potential enemies. In order for both the United States and China to overcome this mistrust 
of each other, other actions must be taken. On the U.S. side, there are numerous steps it 
can take to foster more trust. First, the United States could assure China that the United 
States, short of a Sino-U.S. armed conflict, will keep the Persian Gulf-China sea lanes of 
communication open. This pledge may increase China’s trust it has in the United States 
and also its willingness to cooperate with the United States. Secondly, the United States 
should cooperate with China in the fields of: (a) energy efficiency and conservation, (b) 
energy and air pollution, and (c) development of alternative energy (to include nuclear 
energy). Undeniably, there are challenges in this area due to U.S. companies’ concerns 
regarding China respecting intellectual property rights. If the United States and China are 
able to work through the intellectual property rights issue and U.S. companies share 
energy efficiency and alternative energy technologies with China, there is great potential 
for China to reduce its energy security concerns and may also increase the trust it has in 
the United States.202 The less concern China has regarding its energy security, the less 
likely it will continue its aggressive behavior in the global energy realm which would be 
greatly beneficial for the global energy market. 
Militarily, the United States and China could develop closer Sino-U.S. military 
ties to foster more trust and cooperation. Currently, the U.S. and Chinese militaries view 
each other with deep mistrust and skepticism regarding each other’s intensions. 
Increasing dialogue in the military sphere and also increasing Sino-U.S. military 
interaction could foster more trust from the Chinese and lead to more cooperation not 
only within but also outside the military sphere. 
Many policy makers in Washington may be against this option because closer 
coordination between the United States and China will force the United States to 
acknowledge Chinese economic, military, and political interests. These policy makers 
may view this as a decrease in U.S. power and influence in the Middle East, which may 
be the case. But the other options would likely cause an even larger decline in U.S. power 
and influence.  Working against or ignoring Chinese interests will only embolden China 
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to undermine U.S. efforts in the Middle East even further. While some people may 
believe that it may not be possible for China and the United States to work together, there 
are indications that state otherwise. China and the United States have shown that they can 
work together towards mutual objectives with their handling of the North Korean nuclear 
crisis. Through intensive dialogue and cooperation, China and the United States were 
able to diffuse the North Korean nuclear crisis peacefully. Additionally, China has 
already stated its desires to work with the United States on energy security.203 The 
foundation to increase Sino-U.S. dialogue and cooperation exists. The question is 
whether the United States and China will take advantage of the situation. If China and the 
United States can develop a relationship of mutual trust and understanding, the two 
countries will likely yield immense benefits.  
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